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1. SUMMARY: These curve-lined cases raise several 
issues concerning prison searches and intentional destruction 
of inmates' non-contraband property. 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Petr Hudson conducted 
an unannounced "shakedown" of resp Palmer's locker in the 
prison where resp is incarcerated. Resp contended that the 
seach was illegal and that petr had destroyed some of his non-
'---------- ---
contraband personal property. [Petr did not find contraband.] 
Resp brought this §1983 action, claiming that the shakedown 
was part of an attempt by petr to harass resp. 
The DC granted summary judgment for petr, holding that 
petr's destruction of resp's property is not a denial of due 
process un~ ~tt v. Taylor because resp has an adequate 
~~~ ' remedy. The DC also held that the claim of harassment does 
not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment. 
On appeal, the~ affirmed in part,~versed in part, and 
remanded. It held that the DC correctly held that Parratt 
prevents a cause of action for destruction of property. This 
is so even though 4 justices stated that they would limit its 
scope to negligent acts. There is no satisfactory rationale (? 
for such a limitation; neither JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE L 
MARSHALL, nor JUSTICE POWELL offered a satisfactory rationale. 
"[O]nce it is assumed that a postdeprivation remedy can cure 
an unintentional but negligent act causing injury, inflicted 
by a state agent which is unamenable to prior review, then 
that principle applies as well to random and unauthorized 
- 3 -
intentional acts." TheCA also affirmed the DC on the 8th 
Amend. 
The CA also held, however, that summary judgment was 
premature with respect to the search of the locker. Resp 
claims the search was conducted as a means of harassment. 
~Petr claims it was a routine search. Since there is a genuine 
issue of fact, summary judgment is proper only if it can be 
said that resp had no privacy interest in the locker. Other 
CAs have held that prisoners have a limited privacy interest. 
Irregular, unannounced searches of prisoner property are 
permissible to ensure that prisoners do not possess 
contraband. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 u.s. 520, 555-57 (1979). 
But searches motivated by the guard's desire to harass or 
humiliate are not legitimate; the 4th Amend exists to protect 
individuals from such arbitrary and oppressive invasions of 
personal security. The proper balance is to require prison 
authorities, if the validity of the search is questioned, to 
prove that adequate grounds existed to justify the search. 
This may be done by proving that the search was conducted 
pursuant to an established program of random searches, or that 
some reasonable basis existed for a belief that the prisoner 
possessed contraband. A DC should consider direct proof that 
the search was impermissibly motivated. Parratt does not 
affect the remedy for an unreasonable search. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that prisoners do not 
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their cells. He 
relies on JUSTICE POWELL's concurrence in United States v. 
·- - 4 -
Robinson, 414 u.s. 218, 237 (1973). Bell v. Wolfish indicates 
that prison administrators must be given great latitude in 
preserving order and security. Petr contends the CAs are 
hopelessly split on the riature of the 4th Amend rights 
retained by prisoners. Among others (cited at Pet. 6), 
Marrero v. Commonwealth, 222 Va 754, 284 S.E.2d 811 (1981) 
directly conflicts with the decision below. The VaSCt 
explicitly rejected the standards established by the CA in 
this case. It held that a prisoner's locker affords him a 
right of privacy in relation to other inmates, but not as to 
prison security officers. 
Petr also contends that, even if the 4th Amend applies 
for exclusionary rule purposes, as some CAs have held, it does 
not apply for purposes of damages under §1983. 
Petr also contends that the 14th Amend does not provide 
resp with an expectation of privacy in this case. The CA 
should not have distinguished Parratt. The only right the CA 
is protecting is the right to be free from harassment, which 
is adequately handled by post-deprivation remedies in the 
prison. 
Resp contends that, although the analysis of what is 
reasonable changes in the prison context, the 4th Amend 
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies in 
prison. Although a prisoner's privacy interest must be 
subordinated to the legitimate concerns of law enforcement, it 
still exists. Resp alleged that petr conducted destructive, 
ransacking searches of his cell and destroyed his property for 
- 5 -
no reason other than to harass him. These searches were 
nothing more than official abuses of power. Resp does not 
refer to the conflict. 
Resp has filed a cross-petn in which he contends that 
Parratt should not have been applied to this case at all. 
Resp contends that intentional deprivations of property by an 
official abuse of power consititutes a due process violation 
notwithstanding the existence of state remedies, or at least 
when state relief is uncertain. Resp relies on the separate 
opinions in Parratt. In any event, Va does not provide an 
adequate postdeprivation remedy. 
Resp also contends that lower courts need guidance in 
interpreting Parratt. There are numerous conflicts. 
Petr contends the CA correctly applied Parratt. Va 
provides a definite, effective post-deprivation remedy. Va 
Code §8.01-195.1 et ~is a tort claims act similar to the 
one at issue in Parratt, in which Va has clearly waived its 
sovereign immunity. Petr also contends the cases applying 
Parratt are consistent. 
4. DISCUSSION: There does appear to be a conflict on 
the issue raised in the petn. There is not a direct conflict 
on the issue raised in the cross-petn. These cases present a 
broad range of questions about §1983 that may be worth 
addressing. If the cross-petn is granted, however, the grant 
should be limited to the first question presented. The CA 
found that Va provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. 
- 6 -
The second question presented challenges this view of state 
law, and does not merit review here. 
If the Court believes it can reach some agreement to 
bring some order to this area, this would be a good case to 
grant, limited in the cross-petn to the first question 
presented. 
There are responses to the petn and the cross-petn, and 
motions of resp to proceed ifp on the petn and the cross-petn. 
June 17, 1983 Jaffe Opn in Petn 
Court ................... . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . 
Also motion to proceed ~· 
Burger, Ch. J .......... . 
HOLD 
FOR 
Brennan, J ................... . 
White, J ..................... . 
Marshall, J .................. . 
Blackmun, J ................. . 
CERT. 
G D 
·voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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HUDSON GINA-POW 
82-1630 Hudson(prison guard) v. Palmer and 
82-6695 Palmer v. Hudson 
Having read the briefs, this is a memo to refresh my 
recollection on certain points. This case is probably set 
for December, and I will have to reread the briefs when a 
bench memo is available. 
Palmer (plaintiff) was a prisoner in a state prison 
for various felonies, including bank robbery. He brought 
this §1983 suit against Hudson (defendant) a prison guard. 
The suit is against Hudson only; not against other 
officials or the state. 
His complaint consists of the standard form provided 
for prisoners use. Its critical averment is that 
defendant "shook down my locker and destroyed a lot of my 
property, i.e. legal materials, letters, and other 
personal property only as a means of harrassment. The 
shake-down was no routine shake-down" 
The case was tried on summary judgment motions. 
The defendant filed an affidavit avering that he had 
conducted only a routine shake-down, that it was not for 
harassment purposes, and was merely a routine search for 
contraband. He denied that any of the prisoner's 
possessions were destroyed. 
The District Court (Judge Dalton) dismissed the case, 
but CA4 reversed and remanded for trial. The opinion by 
Chief Judge Winter considered two separate questions: 
1. It held that Parratt v. Taylor, 451 u.s. 527 was 
the relevant authority with respect to the plaintiff's 
claim that his property was intentionally destroyed. 
Parratt involved only a negligent deprivation of property, 
but CA4 held that its principle applied also to an 
intentional deprivation. 
The plaintiff's cross-petition in this case appeals 
from this decision, and argues that Parratt cannot be so 
extended. The holding in Parratt also depended on the 
availability of an adequate state remedy. Plaintiff 
argues here that there may not be an adequate state remedy 
because of sovereign immunity. The flaw in this argument 
is that the suit was brought only against the individual 
guard, not against the state or any official of it. 
Given my view that the Constitution is trivialized by 
finding Constitutional rights whenever a personal or 
property tort is committed, I have no difficulty in 
concluding that the cross-petition is frivolous. In 
Parratt I did make a distinction between negligent and 
intentional conduct, but given decision in Parratt I agree 
with CA4 on this issue. 
2. The more important question is whether a prison 
inmate has a reasonable expectation of privacy in prison, 
and therefore is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection 
against unreasonable searches. 
-------------------~ 
CA4 concluded that there is a limited privacy 
interest that is protected by the Fourth amendment. The 
Fourth Circuit drew a distinction between regular searches 
and "individual shake-downs searches, such as that alleged 
here". Appendix 16. The Fourth Circuit then concluded: 
"Pris<;>ners will be accorded ~ol!le _grotes.tion 
from abusive searches 6y requ!!Ing gr1s~ner 
aut or I ies, I t e val ia I ty of" t:lie search is 
I /f ,, 
question~, to prove that adequate ~rQYnds 
existed to ·ustffy the search. When the-search 
is a ake-down o a particular prioner's 
property, this may be done in one of two ways: 
Either by proving that the search was done 
pursuant to an established program of conducting 
random searches of single cells or groups of 
cells reasonably designed to deter or discover 
the possession of contraband; or, by proving 
that some reasonable basis existed for the 
belief that the prisoner possessed contraband". 
Appendix 16. 
The Fourth Circuit had previously held that 
"prisoners have a limited privacy interest and should be 
free from unreasonable searches and unjustifiable 
confiscations", citing decisions from seven courts of 
appeals. I hope that my clerk will take a look at these 
decisions. I would be surprised if the law is as well-
settled as CA4 indicates. 
This is not a good case to address the Constitutional 
question because it is here on summary judgment, and CA4 
remanded for trial on the facts. But CA4 placed the 
~~burden of proof on the s~~~ to show that the search was 
reasonable. This is a rather extraordinary holding (if I 
c..c ___ _ 
understand it correctly). The burden customarily is 
placed on the plaintiff. Moreover, if CA4's decision in 
its present form becomes a law, the flood of §1983 prison 
suits that has increased each year will given a new 
impetus. At least, CA4 erred in its allocation of the 
burden of proof. 
Perhaps the fundamental question is whether there is 
an expectation of privacy that is reasonable. In Justice 
Harlen's concurring in Katz, he observed that "there is a 
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, 
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable". 389 u.s. at 361. 
It is far from clear that a convicted felon even has 
any subjective expectation of privacy. But apart from 
this, I am not yet persuaded that if such an expectation 
existed, it would be viewed as "reasonable" in light of 
the compelling state interest to perserve order in 
prisons, to limit the drug traffic in prisons, and 
generally to assure prison security. The task of penal 
institutions is difficult enough without inviting the kind 
of litigation that CA4's opinion is likely to encourage. 
See my opinion in Rhoads. 
*** 
Having indicated my initial reactions, I add that I 
have not read the authorities relied on by CA4. I am 
familar with our Bell and Wolff decisions in which we 
d..o 
recognized that prisoners retain some Constitutional 
rights that are not inimical to prison administration or 
security. Neither of these cases, however, specifically 
ad~sed the Fourth Amendment question presented here. 
In Lanza v. New York, 370 u.s. 138, 142-143, (J. Stewart), 
a plurality of the Court held that there was no 
expectation of privacy on the part of prison inmates. CA4 
' '. 
seems to think that the rationale of Lanza was not 
accepted in Wolff and Bell. 
L.F.P. 
. .. 
jen 12/05/83 ~ lo)z;:; 1>--~ ~ 
r)~~~~,~~~ -
~ .4.-~ ~!::!~ ~J... ~ 
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Questions Presented 
1. Does the rule of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 u.s. 527 (1981), 
that state tort remedies satisfy due process for negligent depri-
vations of property, extend to intentional deprivations? 
2. Does the destruction and confiscation of property during 
a prison cell search conducted with the aim of harassing the 





I. Summary of Facts & Decisions Below 
Prisoner Palmer brought this §1983 action alleging that pris-
on guard Hudson violated his constitutional rights in conducting 
a search of Palmer's prison locker solely for the purposes of 
harassment, and destroying Palmer's property. The District Court 
(Dalton, J.) held that, under Parratt v. Taylor, supra, the tort 
remedies available to Palmer in the Virginia courts constituted 
all the process that was due for the deprivation of property. It 
also held that the harassment allegation did not rise to the lev-
el of cruel and unusual punishment. The DC appears not to have 
considered the possibility of a Fourth Amendment violation (Palm-
er at that point was proceeding pro se) • 
CA4 (Winter, Phillips, Murnaghan) affirmed. It agreed with 
-r 
the DC's analysis of Parratt. It also found, however, that the 
-Lit:! 
shakedown search was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. It~
said that prisoners retained limited privacy rights in prison, 
and that those rights could be infringed only where necessary so 
as not to impair prison administration or security. Because of 
the danger of harassment from shakedown searches, the court re-
qui red that they be conducted either under a prison policy of 
random searches, or on the basis of some reasonable basis to be-
lieve the search will uncover contraband. The prison would be 
I ' " \ required to prove one of these bases if the prisoner alleged a 
wrongful search • 
. , 
II. Discussion 
1. Summary. Palmer advances three ways in which the search 
and destruction of property here might be unconstitutional: (1) 
as a deprivation of property without due process of law; (2) as a 
violation of a substantive due process right to be protected from 
abuse of official power; and (3) as a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
I conclude that your concurrence in Parratt v. Taylor, supra, 
as well as the logic of the majority opinion, suggest that the 
Parratt rule that postdeprivation state law remedies provide due 
process for deprivations of property should extend to this inten-
tional but unauthorized deprivation. Predeprivation hearings ----.. 
will be ineffective in preventing this random, unauthorized act. 
I also conclude that Virginia tort law remedies are adequate. 
I recommend against creating a substantive due process right 
to be protected against abuse of power in a case involving an 
attack on property rather than the person. I also think that it 
does not "shock [] the conscience," the apparent standard for the tnl. 
creation of such to 1-o rights, leave prisoners abused by prison 
- ~
guards to state law remedies. h~ 
The Fourth Amendment question is more difficult. Since~
sonable expectations of privacy" in prison are governed solely by 
prison regulations and customs, rather than by shared societal 
values, standard Fourth Amendment analysis would constitutional-
ize every claim that a search was conducted in violation of pris-
on policy. Therefore, I begin with the proposition that prisons 
c:___ 




Bell v. Wolfish, 441 u.s. 520, 563 (1979), as well as dicta in 
the majority opinion, suggests that there is some continued role 
for the Fourth Amendment, at least when official and authorized 
intrusions on the person rather than property are involved. I do 
not think the fact that the search here was unauthorized should 
make a difference because whether state law would protect the 
state actor or not has never made a difference in Fourth Amend-
rnent analysis. I have much greater difficulty with whether the 
-tL lll 
Fourth Amendment should protect inmate interests in property, as 
--~ ) ~ ------------------
opposed to persons. On the one hand, prisons must have virtually 
plenary control over inmate property, and recognizing a right 
here would tend to expand the §1983 docket of the federal courts. 
On the other hand, it is difficult to call any search that is 
based solely on harassment a "reasonable" search. My bottom line ~$ 
is that there is some residual Fourth Amendment protection in /J7...L..d 
prisons, even for property, but that CA4 erred in allocating to 
the prison the burden of proving that a search was not abusive. 
2. Procedural due process. In Parratt v. Taylor, supra, the 
Court considered the procedural protections required to satisfy 
due process when a negligent taking of property is alleged. The 
majority held that such takings constituted "deprivation" of 
property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, but that 
state tort remedies provided the necessary process. It based the 
latter holding on the view that predepr ivation process is not 
required when quick action by the State was necessary or when 
providing such process was impracticable. See 451 u.s., at 539. 
In Parra t t, involving the negligent loss of a rna i 1-order hobby 
.. 
kit, the Court found that the deprivation occurred as a result of 
"a random and unauthorized act by a state employee" so that pro-
viding predeprivation property would be impossible. Id., at 541. 
You concurred only in the result. You found no "deprivation" 
of property where the state actor was alleged to have acted only 
negligently, rather than intentionally. In a footnote that is 
important here, however, you noted that 
[a]ssuming that there was a "deprivation" of the hobby 
kit under color of state law in this case, I would 
agree with the Court's conclusion that state tort reme-
dies provide adequate procedural protection. Cf. 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 u.s. 651, 674-682 (1977) 
(common-law remedies are adequate to afford procedural 
due process in cases of corporal punishment of stu-
dents). 
451 u.s., at 547, n.l. (You also said that the Court had failed 
to address any substantive due process right; addressing that 
question, you found no such right to be free from negligent de-
privations of property. This part of your concurrence is consid-
ered infra.) 
The footnote in your concurrence in Parratt strongly suggests 
that you would view the state law remedies discussed by the rna-
jority in Parratt as providing the process needed for intention-
al, and not just negligent, deprivations of property. You cited-
-though only with a "cf."--your opinion for the Court in 
Ingraham, which involved an intentional deprivation (in that 
case, of liberty). 
In any case, the majority's analysis in Par rat t--wh ich your ) 
footnote clearly appears to have endorsed--probably should not be \ 
limited to negligent deprivations. The majority emphasized that 
J 
not part of an authorized policy. It was a "random" act the oc-
cur renee of which could not be predicted. Therefore elaborate 
predeprivation procedures would be of no avail. In this case, 
where an officer is alleged to have acted intentionally, it is 
less true that predeprivation procedures would have no effect. 
Since the officer allegedly intended to act, a requirement of a 
hearing before he did so would prevent him from acting wrongful-
ly. The crucial fact in Parratt, however, was that the act was 
unauthorized. Here, the act also is alleged to be unauthorized. 
'---"--- - - -- '- ~ I believe that fact, if true, makes it unlikely that 
predeprivation procedures ~k to have effect. If the are 11 ely any 
guard is not prevented from acting wrongfully by the available 
postdeprivation remedies, there is nothing to suggest that 
predeprivation remedies would make any difference. I conclude, 
therefore, that Parratt should extend to intentional but unautho-
rized deprivations of property. - ----- The only time a predeprivation ,_.--hearing can be effective is when the deprivation is pursuant to 
some official rocedure. 
The same result obtains if the problem is analyzed under 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), as Palmer urges. That 
case requires consideration of three factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected ••• ~ 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest ••. and the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards~ and final-
ly, the [state] interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that 
the additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail. 
'. 
Id. , at 3 35. Si nee the officer's search is unauthorized, it 
seems that the probable value of additional procedures is virtu-
ally nil. Even if a prior hearing were required before every 
search, or every confiscation of property, I suspect the costs in 
terms of security would be too great to justify the deterrent 
effect on guards bent on harassment. 1 
The procedural due process question thus turns on whether the 
state procedures provided by tort remedies and the prison griev-
ance mechanism are adequate. I do not believe Palmer succeeds in 
proving that sovereign immunity might bar a suit against Hudson 
in state court for intentional wrongs. The Virginia federal 
courts that have examined the law have concluded that sovereign 
immunity would offer no protection in a case like this. See 
Petr. Reply Br. at 12-13. On the other hand, I would be reluc-
tant to rely on the inmate grievance procedure, even if it pro-
vides for compensation, since I suspect there is cause to wonder 
how fair those tribunals were at the time Palmer brought his ac-
tion. See Addendum at 15-16 (warden or his designate initially 
decides grievances). 
2. Substantive due process. Prisoner Palmer suggests that 
1It is true, as Palmer points out, see Resp. Br. at 14, 
n.l4, that Parratt's reliance on state procedures may mean that 
negligent action by state officials, which is often immune from 
suit in state court, will be actionable in the federal courts, 
while intentional wrongs, which are often not immune, will not 
be. This is a consequence of the Court's holding in Parratt and 
not of this case. In any case, it is possible that the good 
faith immunity available in §1983 actions, see Butz v. Economou, 
438 u.s. 478 (1978), would prevent many if not most actions 
founded on negligence. 
there is a substantive due process right to be free of intention-
al abuses of state power. If so, a §1983 action should be avail-
able to remedy the denial of that right. This view finds some 
support in your concurrence in Parratt. You wrote, "The Due 
Process Clause imposes substantive limitations on state action, 
and under proper circumstances these limitations may extend to 
intentional and malicious deprivations of liberty and property, 
even where compensation is available under state law." 451 U.S., 
at 552-553 (footnotes omitted). In support of the limitation on 
intentional deprivations of property, you cited two lower court 
cases that allowed actions against prison officials alleging an 
intentional taking of property stored with the officials. Id., 
at 553, n.l2 (citing Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 545 F.2d 1059, 1061 
(CA7 1976) (en bane), and Carter v. Estelle, 519 F.2d 1136 (CAS 
1975) (per curiam)). 
The creation of any substantive due process right is essen-
tially a matter of policy. This case is not an exceptj.on. The 
broad right to be free from intentional abuses of power that 
Palmer advances is not dictated by any of this Court's cases. 
The language Palmer relies on, see Resp. Br. at 14-21, is gener-
ally dicta in distinguishable cases. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 
167 (1961), involved a violation of an explicit constitutional 
guarantee, the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. (Monroe dealt with a warrantless night-
time search of a home by 13 police officers.) The language in 
Screws v. United States, 325 u.s. 91 (1945), is dictum in a case 
having to do with abuses of power against the person, rather than 
property. (Screws involved the murder of a prisoner by police; 
the question presented was whether the criminal counterpart of 
§1983 was unconstitutionally vague.) Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los 
Angeles, 227 u.s. 278 (1913), is a Lochner-era case involving 
allegedly confiscatory utility rates. 
When it is appropriate to create a substantive due process 
right is not entirely clear. In Rochin v. California, 342 u.s. 
165 (1952) (police forced vomiting to discover drugs defendant 
had swallowed), the standard appears to have been whether the 
pol ice conduct "shock red] the conscience. II Id. ' at 172. Because 
of the essential guidelessness of substantive due process, and 
the dangers of encouraging courts to create such rights, I would 
think the standard must be at least that high. 
f: 
In my view, it would be inappropriate to create such a ri9ht 
' .......____ /1 
n this case. Two considerations are paramount. First, the de-
~ ri~here was of property, not of liberty or life. A random 
9 ~ beating by a prison guard, and abuses directed at the person gen-
erally, would raise a far closer question. If the standard is 
whether conduct "shocks the conscience," such a distinction is 
appropriate. Second, since Parratt v. Taylor, supra, ensures 
that deprivations like that which occurred in this case are at 
least partially remediable by state procedures, the real question 
is whether it shocks the conscience to require the outrages here 
to be submitted to a state forum. The advantages of a federal 
forum and of litigating under §1983--~, attorney's fees under 
§1988--are not insubstantial, but they certainly are not funda-
mental in the way that the right to an abortion is. (It may be 
that in Screws, which can be read to assume a substantive due 
process right not to be murdered in state custody, the Court felt 
that leaving abused black prisoners to the remedies provided by 
Georgia's 1945 criminal process would shock the conscience.) 
Thus, I would not recommend recognizing a due process right 
to be free of abuse of authority. This does not leave prisoners 
without federal protection. It simply means that they are left 
with only the protections textually provided--the guarantees of 
due process and equal protection, the prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment, and, perhaps, the bar on unreasonable search-
es and seizures. 
4. Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment question in this 
case pushes prior doctrine beyond its 1 imi ts. Standard Fourth 
Amendment analysis would have the Court look for reasonable or 
legitimate expectations of privacy in Palmer's prison locker and 
possessions. See vt:atz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1968). 
Outside of prisons and like institutions, the concept of legiti-
mate expectations of privacy has some content independent of 
court pronouncements, because of the shared views of how much 
society and government can intrude on the individual. In prison, 
a given prisoner's expectations of privacy are determined almost 
entirely by the rules and customs of the prison. If it was pris-
on policy to subject all prisoners to abusive and harassing 
searches, traditional Fourth Amendment analysis would of fer no 
protection to prisoners, since they would have no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy. (The Eighth Amendment might place limits 
on such conduct, however.) On the other hand, any search more 
intrusive than permitted by prison administrative rules would 
infringe on a legitimate expectation of privacy. Traditional 
Fourth Amendment analysis would then ask whether there was a jus-
tification for the intrusion. If not, a constitutional claim 
would be made out. 
The trouble is that this approach would J6onsti tutionalize 
every violation of prison search guidelines :' Given proper proce-
'- ~---------------------------------
dures and proper allocation of burdens of proof, this would not 
necessarily be disastrous for the dockets of the federal courts. 
But it would mean that the content of the Fourth Amendment, which ~~ 
-z:_.- 4 
has heretofore been thought to be uniform throughout the country, 
would vary from institution to institution. It would also create 
~ ~------------
an incentive for institutions to create absolutely minimal guide-
lines and limitations on searches in order to avoid federal court 
intrusion. That the federal courts and this Court would have a 
role in enforcing prison administrative regulations seems to me a 
distinctly odd result. I conclude that prisons require some de-
'-- ----- _ ... 
from ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis. 
---------~--------------~---------------One possible role for the Fourth Amendment is that it would 
protect privacy interests that are so fundamental that they are 
retained from the outside when an inmate enters prison. See 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 u.s. 735, 740 n.S (1979) (dictum) (sug-
gesting that w~en subjective expectations of privacy are condi-
tioned by influences "alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment 
freedoms," a "normative inquiry" is proper); see also Katz v. 
United States, 389 u.s. 347, 361 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(expectation of privacy must "be one that society is prepared to 
...... 
/ 
recognize as 'reasonable'"). In your dissent in Bell v. Wolfish, 
441 u.s. 520, 563 (1979), you appeared to suggest some such inde-
pendent role for the Fourth Amendment. There, pretrial detainees 
challenged prison policies of searching cells without prisoners 
present and of visually inspecting body cavities after contact 
visits. The Court assumed that the Fourth Amendment applied in 
9 
prison, and upheld both practices as reasonable. You dissented 
with respect to body-cavity searches, and in doing so you ap-
----------------------------------------peared to acknowledge that privacy interests continued in prison. 
You wrote: 
Ibid. 
In view of the serious intrusion on one's privacy occa-
sioned by such a search, I think at least some level of 
cause, such as a reasonable suspicion, should be re-
quired to justify the anal and genital searches de-
scribed in this case. I therefore dissent on this 
issue. 
This suggests that you saw some residuum of pr ivaqy_ in 
prison, independent of prison rules. Moreover, there is language 
in the Court's opinion that suggests that it, too, thought that 
there was some rock-bottom role for the Fourth Amendment in pris-
on. While the opinion, per JUSTICE REHNOUIST, stated that it 
merely assumed that the Fourth Amendment applied in prison, it 
discussed whether that Amendment might address the problem of 
body-cavity searches conducted in an abusive manner. The Court 
suggested that it would, noting, "Such abuse cannot be condoned. 
The searches must be conducted in a reasonable manner," id., at 
560, and cited a Fourth Amendment case, Schmerber v. California, 
384 u.s. 757, 771-772 (1966). 
If the Fourth Amendment continues to protect prisoners 
against certain kinds of very intrusive searches, the question is 
whether the search here implicates the kind of fundamental values 
that are protected. It might be tempting to answer this question 
the way the substantive due process inquiry was answered, supra. 
That is, it might be concluded that only very intrusive searches 
that are part of a prison policy or program, as in Bell, are sub-
ject to Fourth Amendment strictures. Instrus i ve searches that 
are merely individual abuses of power would be subject only to a 
state-law or statutory remedy. Put another way, the only privacy 
right subject to federal protection that would be said to be car-
r ied into prison with the inmate would be the right not to be 
subjected to a system that routinely subjects him to harassing 
and abusive procedures. 
One problem here is that this would require distinguishing or 
overruling Monroe v. Pape, supra. There the Court ruled that in 
a nonpr ison context that the fact that the state constitution 
provided protection identical to that provided by the Fourth 
Amendment was no bar to asserting a §1983 claim for an unreason-
able search. See 365 u.s., at 183. The rule appears to be that 
II ~~ • 
at least when a violation of a textual right is alleged, exhaus-
tion of state remedies is not required. Of course, prisons are 
different, but I am not sure they are different in a way that is 
relevant to this question. The Court in Monroe based its view on 
the legislative history of §1983, which it read to contain an 
intent to ensure "a federal right in federal courts because, by 
reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, 
·, 
/ '~~~ 
state laws might not be enforced." 365 u.s., at 180. The same 
risk exists in prison. Another way to distinguish Monroe might 
be that that case concerned the scope of the federal remedy under 
§1983, and not of the canst i tut ional right. The issue here is 
the extent of the Fourth Amendment right. To this the only an-
swer is that it seems to me that an unreasonably intrusive search 
conducted without authorization is still unreasonable. I con-
elude that, while it is possible to limit the Fourth Amendment to 
barring intrusive searches carried out pursuant to policy, rather 
than those that are the result of individual harassment, this 
would introduce an entirely new factor into Fourth Amendment 
analysis. It has always been thought that the bar on unreason-
able searches by government depended to a greater extent on the 
character of the intrusion than on the nature of the intruder. I 
do not think the prison context dictates such a change. 
Another approach to the question of what fundamental rights 
of privacy one carries into prison is to examine the personal 
interest abused rather than the nature of the abuse. The primary 
difference between the interest implicated by the discussions in 
Bell and that here is that here the search is of property, not of 
the person. There is a commonsense difference between the degree 
of intrusion that is reasonable in a search of a person and that 
which is reasonable in a search of property. This distinction is / 
highlighted in prison, because of the important need to control ~ 
the possession of weapons and other contraband. That need die-
tates that prison authorities have virtually plenary control over 
the prisoners' right to have property. They could no doubt re-
' . 
quire that all property be kept out in the open at all time, or 
perhaps prohibit possessions entirely. Therefore, it may be that 
any search of a possession capable of secreting contraband is a 
reasonable one. Although it is true that the body can also be 
used to secrete contraband, in cases of searches of the person 
the prisoner's more basic right to bodily integrity is implicat-
ed. 
I frankly am uncertain at this point how I would rule on this 
question. On the one hand, as Palmer points out, the search al-- -leged here was plainly unreasonable because it was, as alleged, 
utterly unjustified. On the other hand, it is not clear that 
prisoners should have constitutionally recognized privacy rights 
in property. In particular, recognizing such rights would allow 
the continued expansion of the federal §1983 docket, a problem 
you have more than once warned against, see Parratt, supra, at 
554 n.l3 (Powell, J., concurring in the result). But see 42 
u.s.c. §1997e, discussed in Cross-Petr. Reply at 11-14 (Congress 
now allows courts to require that prisoners exhaust prison griev-
ance mechanisms in certain circumstances) . It may be that a pro-
phylactic rule is necessary to allow prison authorities suffi-
cient freedom to do their job. 
My very tentative view is that the sheer unreasonableness of 
'-----------r-_, ,, ....., 
the search ~~leged here is the paramount consideration. The lan-
guage of the Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures." I have difficulty 
finding in this language any way to exempt from protection plain-
11 •• 
ly unreasonable searches of "papers and effects," simply because 
they occur in prison. The judicial gloss limiting protection to 
legitimate expectations of privacy is simply not appropriate to 
the prison context. The prison's plenary control over inmate 
property may justify far more restrictive actions than this, but 
it cannot justify pure harassment. 
This does not mean CA4 should be affirmed, however. That 
court required prison officials "to prove adequat grounds exist-
ed to justify the search" solely on allegation that it was abu-
sive. J.A. at 43. This is far too low a standard. As Hudson 
points out, Petr. Br. at 21-22, the burden should be on the pris- ~ 
oner to make out a prima facie case. At the least, the prisoner ~~~ 
should be required to make specific allegations of the precise 
ways in which the search was far in excess of what was reason-
able, and of why he thinks the search was intended solely to ha-
rass. Objective facts would have to be alleged, rather than con-
elusions. In the absence of a plain admission of harassment, a 
pattern or practice would probably be necessary to prove intent. 
Measured under these standards, the complaint and affidavits 
here fell far short. The affidavits and complaints do not state 
how the search exceeded the customary or authorized search, nor 
any basis other than a passing remark for their suspicion that 
the search was motivated by harassment. In addition, they fail 
to mention that the search was carried out by two officers, not 
just one, and show no basis whatsoever for believing that the 
second officer had a harassing pur se. 
III. RECOMMENDATION: Reverse & remand. 
/~~~ 
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RUSSELL THOMAS PALMER, JR., PETITIONER 
82-6695 v. 
TED S. HUDSON 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF ~ . ~ 
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT c:::;~ . 
[June-, 1984] U 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari in No. 82-1630 to decide whether a 
prison inmate has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
prison cell entitling 1i1m to --ui'eprotection of Uie Fourth 
Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
We also granted certiorari in No. ~2-66911 the cross-petition, 
to determine whether our decision in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 
U. S. 527 (1981), which held that a negligent deprivation of 
prope~ by state offi:cials does not violate the Fourteenth 
Arileiiament if an adequate postdei:>rivation state remeay ex-
isfs,s houla extend to intentional deprivations of property. 
I 
The facts underlying this dispute are relatively simple. 
Respondent Palmer is an inmate at the Bland Correctional 
Center in Bland, Va., serving sentences for forg~r­
i~, and bank robbery convictions. On Sep-
tember 16, 1981, petitioner Hudson, an officer at the Correc-
82-1630 & 82-6695-0PINION 
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tional Center, with a fellow officer, conducted a "shakedown" 
search of res ondent's prison locker and cell for COntra and. 
Durmg t e "shakedown, ' t e o cers discovered a ripped pil-
l wcase in a trashcan near respondent's cell bunk. Charges 
against Palmer were instituted under the prison disciplinary 
procedures for destroying State property. After a hearing, 
Palmer was found guilty on the charge and was ordered to 
reimburse the State for the cost of the material destroyed; in 
addition, a reprimand was entered on his prison record. 
Palmer subsequently brought this pro se action in United 
States District Court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Respondent 
claimed that Hudson had conducted the shakedown search of 
his cell and had brought a false charge against him solely to 
harass him, and that, in violation of his Fourteenth Amend-
ment ri ht not tol)e de nved of ro erty without due proc-
ess of law, Hudson had intentiona_!!l destroyed certain of his 
noncontraband personal property durmg the September 16 
search. Hudson a 'ed each allegation; he moved for and 
was granted summary jud ent The District Court ac-
cepte responden s a egations as true but held nonetheless, 
relying on Parratt v. Taylor, supra, that the alleged destruc-
tion of respondent's property, even if intentional, did not vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment because there were state 
tort remedies available to redress the deprivation, J. A. 31 1 
and that the alleged harassment did not "rise to the level of a 
constitutional deprivation," id., at 32. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed i!l_])art, 
and remanded fo/ further proceedings. 697 F. 2d 1220 (CA4 
1983):-The court affirmed the District Court's holding that 
respondent was not deprived of his property without due 
process. The court acknowledged that we considered only a 
( 
1 The District Court determined that Palmer could pro~ed against Hud-
son.._in state ~urt either for co~ue, and that under appli-
cable Vir~law, see Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 155 S. E. 2d 369 
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claim of negligent property deprivation in Parratt v. Taylor, 
supra. It agreed with the District Court, however, that the 
logic of Parratt applies equally to unauthorized intentional 
deprivations of property by state officials: "[O]nce it is as-
sumed that a postdeprivation remedy can cure an uninten-
tional but negligent act causing injury, inflicted by a state 
agent which is unamenable to prior review, then that princi-
ple applies as well to random and unauthorized intentional 
acts." I d., at 1223. 2 The Court of Appeals did not discuss 
the availability and adequacy of existing state law remedies; 
it presumably accepted as correct the District Court's state-
ment of the remedies available under Virginia law. 3 
The Court of Appeals reversed the summa judgment on 
resp_om~nt's c a1m at e sha e c was unreason-
able. e coUrt recogruzed that Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 
520~555-557 (1979) authorized in·egular unannounced shake-
down searches of prison cells. But the court held that an in-
dividual prisoner has a "limited prixacy right" in his cell enti-
tling him to protection against searches conducted solely to 
harass or to humiliate. 697 F. 2d, at 1225.4 The shakedown 
2 The Court of Appeals observed that "there is no practical mechanism 
by which Virginia could prevent its guards from conducting personal ven-
dettas against prisoners other thap by punishing them after the fact ... . " 
697 F. 2d, at 1223. · 
3 See n. 1, supra. 
• Petitioner maintai11s that the Court of Appeals' decision rests at least 
in part upon a finding of an independent right of privacy for prisoners 
under the Fourteenth Amendment alone. While, arguably, it is not en-
tirely clear whether the Court of Appeals believed that the limited privacy 
right it recognized was guaranteed solely by the Fourth Amendment, and 
applicable to the States only through the rFourteenth Amendment, or 
whether the right erfianated from the Fourteenth Amendment alone, or 
both. Its opinion, however, explicitly speaks to the "primary purpose of I 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments," id., at 1224, and nowhere does 
it suggest an intention to draw a distinction between the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments right of privacy in prison cells. Under the circum-
stances, we assume, since there is no suggestion to the contrary, that the 
court did not mean to imply in this context that any right of privacy that 
82-1630 & 82-669~0PINION 
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of a single prisoner's property, said the court, is permissible 
only if "done pursuant to an established program of conduct-
ing random searches of single cells or groups of cells reason-
ably designed to deter or discover the possession of contra-
band" or upon reasonable belief that the particular prisoner 
possessed contraband. I d., at 1224. Because the Court of 
Appeals concluded that the record reflected a factual dispute 
over whether the search of respondent's cell was routine or 
conducted to harass respondent, it held that summary judg-
ment was inappropriate, and that a remand was necessary to 
determine the purpose of the cell search. 
We granted certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1983). We af-
firm in part and reverse in part. 
II 
A 
The fir~tion we address is whether respondent has a 
right of privacy in his prison cell entitling him to the protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. 5 As we have noted, the Court of Ap-
peals held that the District Court's summary judgment in pe-
titioner's favor was premature because respondent had a 
"limited privacy right" in his· cell that might have been 
breached. The court concluded that, to protect this privacy 
might exist under the Fourteenth Amendment alone exceeds that that ex-
ists under the Fourth Amendment. 
•The majority of Courts of Appeals have held that a risoner retains at 
least a minima e ee of Fourth men ment rotection in his cell. See 
nited States v. Chamorro, 687 F. 2d 1 (CAl 1982); United States v. 
Hinckley, 672 F. 2d 115 (CADC 1982); United States v. Lilly, 576 F. 2d 
1240 (CA5 1978); United States v. Stumes, 549 F. 2d 831 (CA8 1977); Bon-
ner v. Coughlin, 517 F . 2d 1311 (CA7 1975), aff'd on rehearing, 545 F. 2d 
565 (1976) (en bane), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 932 (1978). The Second and 
Ninth Circuits, however, have held that the Fourth AmendmentdOeS not 
app1Y1ilai)rison cell. See Umted States v. "Httchcock, 467 F. 2d 1107 
(C~nied, 410 U. S. 916 (1973); Christman v. Skinner, 468 
F. 2d 723 (CA2 1972). 
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right, shakedown searches of an individual's cell should be 
perfonned only "pursuant to an established program of con-
ducting random searches ... reasonably designed to deter or 
discover the possession of contraband" or upon reasonable 
belief that the prisoner possesses contraband. Petitioner 
contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that re-
spondent had even a limited privacy right in his cell, and 
urges that we adopt the "bright line" rule that prisoners have 
no legitimate expectation of privacy in their individual cells 
that would entitle them to Fourth Amendment protection. 
We have repeatedly held that prisons are not beyond the 
reach of the Constitution. . No "iron curtain" separates one 
from the other. Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, at 555. In-
deed, we have insisted that prisoners be accorded those 
rights not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment it-
self or incompatible with the objectives of incarceration. 
For example, we have held that invidious racial discrimina-
tion is as intolerable within a prison as outside, except as may 
be essential to "prison security and discipline." Lee v. 
Washington, 390 U. S. 333 (1968) (per curiam). Like oth-
ers, prisoners have the constitutional right to petition the 
Government for redress of their grievances, which includes a 
reasonable right of access to the courts. Johnson v. Avery, 
393 u. s. 483 (1969). 
They must be provided "reasonable opportunities" to exer-
cise their religious freedom guaranteed under the First 
Amendment. Cru:z v. Beto·, 405 U. S. 319 (1972) (per 
curiam). Similarly, prisoners retain those First Amend-
ment rights of speech "not inconsistent with [their] status as 
... prisoner[s] or with the legitimate penological objectives 
of the corrections system." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 
817, 822 (1974). They enjoy the protection of due process. 
Wolffv. McDonnell, supra; Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 
(1972). And the Eighth Amendment ensures that they will 
not be subject to "cruel and unusual punishments." Estelle 
v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 (1976). The continuing guarantee of 
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these substantial rights to prison inmates is testimony to a 
belief that the way a society treats those who have trans-
gressed against it is evidence of the essential character of 
that society. 
However, while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many 
protections of the Constitution, it is also clear that imprison-
ment carries with it the circumscri tion o oss of man--sig-
nificant r1g s. ee Bell v. Wolfish, 441 . S. 520, 545 
(1979). 'l'fiese constraints on inmates, and in some cases the 
complete withdrawal of certain of their rights, are "justified 
by the considerations underlying our penal system." Price 
v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 285 (1948); see also Bell v. Wolf-
ish, 441 U. S. 520, 545-546 (1979), and cases cited; Wolff v. 
McDonnell, supra, at 555. The curtailment of certain rights 
is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad 
of "institutional needs and objectives" of prison facilities, 
Wolffv. McDonnell, supra, at 555, chief among which is in-
ternal security, see Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 823 
(1974). Of course, these restrictions or retractions also 
serve, incidentally, as reminders that, under our system of J 
justice, deterrence, and retribution are factors in addition to 
correction. 
We have not before been called upon to decide the specific 
question whether the Fourth Amendment applies within a 
prison cell, 6 but the nature of our inquiry is well-defined. 
6 InLanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143-144 (1962), a\{i)uralit] of the 
Court termed as "at best a novel argument" the assertion that a prison "is a 
place where [one] can claim constitutional immunity from search or seizure 
of his person, his papers, or his effects." This observation, however, was 
plainly dictum. In fact, three Members of the Court specifically dissented 
from what they characterized as the Court's "gratuitous exposition of sev-
eral grave constitutional issues .... " !d., at 150 (BRENNAN, J., 
dissenting). 
In upholding a room search rule against a Fourth Amendment challenge 
by pretrial detainees in Bell v. Wolfish, supra, the Court acknowledged 
the plausibility of an argument that "a person confined in a detention facil-
ity has no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his room or cell 
82-1630 & 82-6695--0PINION 
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We must determine here, as in other Fourth Amendment 
contexts, if a "justifiable" expectation of privacy is at stake. 
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). The applicabil-
ity of the Fourth Amendment turns on whether "the person 
invoking its protection can claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' 
or a 'legitimate expectation of. privacy' that has been invaded 
by government action." Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, . 
740 (1979), and cases cited. We must decide, in Justice Har-
lan's words, whether a prisoner's expectation of privacy in 
his prison cell is the kind of expectation that "society is 2re-
p ed to reco "ze as 'reasonable.'" Katz, supra, at 360, 361 
(concurring opmwn . 
and that, therefore, the Fourth Amendment provides no protection for 
such a person." 449 U. S., at 556-557. However, as in Lanza, it was un-
necessary to reach the issue of the Fourth Amendment's general applicabil-
ity in a prison cell. We simply assumed arguendo that a pretrial detainee 
retained at least a "diminished expectation of privacy." !d., at 557. 
7 In Katz, Justice Harlan suggested that an expectation of privacy is 
"justifiable" if the person concerned has "exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy" and the expectation ·is one that "society is prepared 
to recognize as 'reasonable."' 389 U. S., at 360, 361 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). The Court has always emphasized the second of these two require-
ments. As Justice White said, writing for the plurality in United States v. 
White, 401 U. S. 745 (1971), "[o]ur problem is not what the privacy expec-
tations of particular defendants in particular situations may be or the ex-
tent to which they may in fact have relied on the discretion of their com-
panions .... Our problem, in terms of the principles announced in Katz, is 
what expectations of privacy are constitutionally 'justifiable' .... " I d., at 
751-752. In the same opinion, even Justice Harlan stressed the control-
ling importance of the second of these two requirements: "The analysis 
must, in my view, transcend the search for subjective expectations .... 
[W]e should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and risks with-
out examining the desirability of saddling them upon society." United 
States v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 768, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
The Court's refusal to adopt a test of "subjective expectation" is under-
standable; constitutional rights are generally not defined by the subjective 
intent of those asserting the rights. The problems inherent in such a 
standard are self-evident. See, e. g., Smith v. Maryland, supra, at 
740-741, n. 5. 
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Notwithstanding our caution in approaching claims that 
the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable in a given context, we 
hold that society is not re ared to recognize as legitimate 
an s ~ective expectation of privacy t at a prisoner nug t 
have m s pnson ce an t a accordingly, t e ou h 
Amendment does not apply within the confines of the prison 
cell. The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their 
individual cells simply cannot be rec.onciled with the concept 
of incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal 
institutions. 
Prisons, by definition, are places of involuntary confine-
ment of persons wno have a demonstrated proclivity for anti-
social criminal, and often violent, conduct. Inmates have 
necessarily shown a lapse in ability to control and conform 
their behavior to the legitimate standards of society by the 
normal impulses of self-restraint; they have shown an inabil-
ity to regulate their conduct in a way that reflects either a 
respect for law or an appreciation of the rights of others. 
Even a partial survey of the statistics on violent crime in our 
Nation's prisons illustrates the magnitude of the problem. 
During 1981 and the first half of 1982, there were over 120 
prisoners murdered--by fellow inmates in State and Federal 
prisons. A number of prison personnel were murdered by 
prisoners during this period. Over twenty-nine riots or sim-
ilar disturbances were reported in these facilities for the 
same time frame. And there were over 125 suicides in these 
institutions. See 8 Corrections Compendium, Prison Vio-
lence (1983). 
Within this volatile "community," prison administrators 
are to take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of not only 
the pr1son staffs and administrative personnel, but visitors. 
They are under an obligation to take reasonable measures to l 
guarantee the safety of the inmates themselves. They must 
be ever alert to attempts to introduce drugs and other con-
traband into the premises which, we can judicially notice, is 
one of the most perplexing problems of prisons today; they 
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must prevent, so far as possible, the flow of illicit weapons 
into the prison; they must be vigilant to detect escape plots, 
in which drugs or weapons may be involved, before the 
schemes materialize. In addition to these monumental 
tasks, it is incumbent upon these officials at the same time to 
maintain as sanitary an environment for the inmates as feasi-
ble, given the difficulties of the environment. 
The adniinistration of a prison, we have said, is "at best an 
extraordinarily difficult undertaking." Wolffv. McDonnell, 
supra, at 566; Hewitt v. Helms,-- U.S.--,-- (1983). 
But it would be literally impossible to accomplish the prison 
objectives identified above if inmates retained a right of pri-
vacy in their cells. Virtually the only place inmates can con-
ceal weapons, drugs and other contraband is in their cells. 
Unfettered access to these cells by prison officials, thus, is 
imperative if drugs and contraband are to be ferretted out 
and sanitary surroundings are to be maintained. 
Determining whether an expectation of privacy is "legiti-
mate" or "reasonable" necessarily entails a _balancing of inter-
ests. The two interests here, of course, are the interest of 
sOcie'ty in the security of its penal institutions and the inter-
est of the prisoner in privacy within his cell, which is already 
limited by the exigencies of the circumstances. We strike 
the balance in favor of institutional security, which we have 
noted is "central to all other corrections goals," Pell v. 
Procunier, supra, at 823. A right of privacy in traditional 
Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible 
with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their 
cells required to ensure institutional security and internal 
order. 
We are satisfied that society would insist that the prison-
er's expectation of privacy always yield to what must be con-
sidered the paramount interest in institutional security; a 
prison "shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an 
automobile, an office, or a hotel room." Lanza v. New York, 
supra, at 143-144. We believe that it is accepted by our so-
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ciety that "[l]oss of freedom of choice and privacy are inher-
ent incidents of confinement." Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 
537. 
The Court of Appeals was troubled by the possibility of 
searches conducted solely to harass inmates; it reasoned that 
a requirement that searches be conducted only pursuant to 
an established policy or upon reasonable suspicion would pre-
vent such searches to the maximum extent possible. Of ( 
course, there is a risk of maliciously motivated searches, and 
of course, intentional harassment of even the most hardened 
criminals cannot be tolerated by a civilized society. How-
ever, we disagree with the court's roposed solution. The 
uncertainty at a en s random search.es of ce ls renders 
these searches perhaps the most effective weapon of the 
prison administrator in the constant fight against the prolif-
eration of knives and guns, illicit drugs and other -contraband. 
The Court of Appeals candidly acknowledged that "the device 
[of random cell searches] is of ... obvious utility in achieving 
the goal of prison security." 697 F. 2d, at 1224. 
A requirement that even random searches be conducted 
pursuant to an established plan would se~iously undermine 
the effectiveness of this weapon. It is naive to believe that 
prisoners would not eventually decipher any plan officials 
might devise for "planned random searches," and thus be 
able routinely to anticipate searches. The Supreme Court of 
Virginia identified the shortcomings of an approach such as 
that adopted by the Court of Appeals and the necessity of al-
lowing prison administrators flexibility: 
"For one to advocate that prison searches must be con-
ducted only pursuant to an enunciated general policy or 
when suspicion is directed at a particular inmate is to ig-
nore the realities of prison operation. Random searches 
of inmates, individually or collectively, and their cells 
and lockers are valid and necessary ,to ensure the secu-
rity of the institution and the safety of inmates and all 
others within its boundaries. This type of search allows 
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prison officers flexibility and prevents inmates from 
anticipating, arid thereby thwarting, a search for contra-
band." o v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 754, 284 
S. E. 2d 809 (1981). '-;:::;-
We share the concerns so well expressed by the Supreme 
Court and its view that wholly random searches are an im-
portant part of the effective security of penal institutions. 
We, therefore, cannot accept even the concededly limited 
holding of the Court of Appeals. 
Respondent acknowledges that routine shakedowns of 
prison cells are essential to the effective administration of 
prisons. Brief for Respondent 7, n. 5. He contends, how-
ever, that he is constitutionally entitled not to be subjected to 
searches conducted only to harass. The crux of his claim is 
that "because searches and seizures to harass are unreason-
able, a prisoner has a reasonable expectation of privacy not to 
have his cell, locker, personal effects, person invaded for 
such a purpose." Brief for Respondent 24. This argument, 
which assumes the answer to the predicate question whether 
a prisoner has - a legitimate expectation of privacy in his 
prison cell at ali, is merely a challenge to the reasonableness 
of the particular search of respondent's cell. Because we 
conclude that prisoners have no legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy and that the F,.ourth Amendment does not apply in 
prison cells, we neEfd not reach this issue. 
Our holding that respondent does not have a reasonable J 
expectation of privacy enabling him to invoke the protections ~ 
of the Fourth Amendment does not mean that he is without a 
remedy for calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs. ~ 
No? does it mea n t1lat prison attendants can ride roughshod 
over inmates' property rights with impunity. The Eighth 
Amendment al~ays stands as a protection against "cruel and 
unusual punishments." By the same token, there are ade-
qu_ate state tprt and commQ!!J.aw la~dies available to_ 
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respondent to redress the alleged destruction of his personal 
property. See discussion infra, at --.8 
B 
In his complaint in the District Court, in addition to his 
claim that the shakedown search of his cell violated his 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment privacy rights, respond-
ent alleged under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 that petitioner intention-
ally destroJ:ed certain of his personal property during the 
search. This destruction, respondent contended, deprived 
him of property without due process, in violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District 
Court dismissed this portion of respondent's complaint for 
failure to state a claim. Reasoning under Parratt v. Taylor, 
supra, it held that even an intentional destruction of prop-
erty by a state employee does not violate due process if the 
state provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed. The question presented for our 
review in Palmer's cross-petition is whether our decision in 
Parratt v. Taylor should extend, as the Court of Appeals 
held, to intentional deprivations of property by state employ-
ees acting under color of state law. 9 
In Parratt v. Taylor, a state prisoner sued prison officials 
under 42 0. S. C. § I9B3, alleging that their negligent loss of 
8 The Commonwealth has a new inmate grievance procedure that was 
effective as of October, 12 1982, see note 14 infra. But it appears that at 
the time of the alleged deprivation of respondent's property, a very similar 
procedure was in effect that would also have afforded respondent relief for 
any destruction of his property. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 13, n. 14. 
9 Four Circuits, including the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in this 
case, have held that Parratt does extend to intentional deprivations of 
property. See Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquest, 699 F. 2d 864 (CA7 1983); 
Engblom v. Carey, 677 F. 2d 957 (CA2 1982); Rutledge v. Arizona Board 
of Regents, 660 F. 2d 1345 (CA9 1981), aff'd sub nom. Rutledge v. Kush, 
- U. S. - (1983). Three Circuits have held that it does not. 
Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F. 2d 387 (CA5 1982); Weiss v. Lehman, 676 F. 
2d 1320 (CA9 1982); Yusuf Asad Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F. 2d 868 
(CA7 1981). 
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a hobby kit he ordered from a mail-order catalogue deprived 
him of property without due process of law, in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit had affirmed the District Court's summary 
judgment in the prisoner's favor. We reversed, holding that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not 
violated when a state employee negligently deprives an indi-
vidual of property, provided that the State makes available a 
meaningful postdeprivation remedy. 10 
We viewed our decision in Parratt as consistent with prior 
cases recognizinithat 
- ~ 
"either the necessity of quick action by the state or the 
impracticability of providing any meaningful 
predeprivation process, when coupled with the availabil-
ity of some meaningful means by which to assess the pro-
priety of the state's action at some time after the initial 
taking ... satisf[ies] the requirements of procedural due 
process." 451 U. S., at 527 (footnote omitted). 
We reasoned that where a loss of property is occasioned by a 
random, unauthorized act by a state employee, rather than 
by an established state procedure, the state cannot predict 
when the loss will occur. Id., at 541. Urider these circum-
stances, we observed, 
"[i]t is difficult to conceive of how the State could provide 
a meaningful hearing before the deprivation takes place. 
The loss of property, although attributable to the state 
as action under "color of law," is in almost all cases be-
yond the control of the State. Indeed, in most cases it is 
10 Nebraska had provided respondent with a tort remedy for his alleged 
property deprivation. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-8,209 et seq. (1976). We held 
that this remedy was entirely adequate to satisfy due process, even 
though we recognized that it might not provide respondent all the relief to 
which he might have been entitled under§ 1983. 451 U. S., at 54~. 
' 
14 
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not only impracticable, but impossible, to provide a 
meaningful hearing before the deprivation." Ibid. 11 
Two Terms ago, we reaffirmed our holding in Pa"rratt in Lo-
gan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422 (1982), in the 
course of holding that postdeprivation remedies do not satisfy 
due process where a deprivation of property is caused by con-
duct pursuant to established state procedure, rather than 
random and unauthorized action. 12 
While Parratt is necessarily limited by its facts to negli-
gent deprivations Of property, it is evident, as the Court of 
Appeals recognizea, that its reasoning applies as well to in-
tentional deprivations of property. The underlying rationale 
of Parratt is that when deprivations of property are effected 
through random and unauthorized conduct of a state em-
ployee, predeprivation procedures are simply "impracticable" 
since the state cannot know when such deprivations will oc-
cur. We can discern no logical distinction between negligent 
and intentional deprivations of property insofar as the "prac-
ticability'' of affording predeprivation process is concerned. ~ 
The State can no more anticipate and control in advance the 
random and unauthorized intentional conduct of its employ-
ees than it can anticipate similar negligent conduct. Argu-
11 In reaching our conclusion in Parratt, we expressly relied on then-
Judge Stevens' opinion for the Seventh Circuit in Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 
F. 2d 1311 (1975), modified en bane, 545 F. 2d 656 (1976), cert. denied, 435 
U. S. 932 (1978), holding that, where an individual has been negligently de-
prived of property by a State employee, the State's action is not complete 
unless or until the State fails to provide an adequate postdeprivation rem-
edy for the property loss. 451 U. S., at 541-542. 
12 In Logan, we examined a claim that the terms of an Illinois statute 
deprived the petitioner of an opportunity to pursue his employment dis-
crimination claim. We specifically distinguished the case from Parratt by 
noting that "Parratt was dealing with a 'random and unauthorized act by a 
state employee ... [and was] not a result of some established state proce-
dure."' 455 U. S., at 435-436 (quoting Parratt, supra, at 541). Parratt, 
we said, "was not designed to reach ... a situation" where the deprivation 
is the result of an established state procedure. I d., at 436. 
82-1630 & 82-6695---0PINION 
HUDSON v. PALMER 15 
ably, intentional acts are even more difficult to anticipate be-
cause one bent on intentionally depriving a person of his 
property might well take affirmative steps to avoid signalling 
his intent. 
If negligent deprivations of property do not violate the Due 
Process Clause because predeprivation process is impracti-
cable, it follows that intentional deprivations do not violate 
that Clause provided, of course, that adequate state 
postdeprivation remedies are available. Accordingly, we 
hold that an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property 
by-a-8tate employee does ot constitu a violation of the 
Fou een men men 1 a eanmgful post epriVation rem-
edYfor the loss is available. For intentional, as for negligent 
deprivations of property by State employees, the State's ac-
tion is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses to 
provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy. 13 
Respondent presses two arguments that require at least 
brief comment. First, he contends that, because an agent of 
the state who intends to deprive a person of his property 
"can provide predeprivation process, then as a matter of due 
process he must do so." Brief for Respondent at 8 (emphasis 
in original). · This argument reflects a fundamental misun-
derstanding of Parratt. There we held that postdeprivation 
procedures satisfy due process because the State cannot pos-
sibly know in advance of a negligent deprivation of property. 
Whether an individual employee himself is able to foresee a 
deprivation is simply of no consequence. The controlling in-
quiry is whether the State is in a position to provide for 
predeprivation process. The obligations of the Fourteenth 
'
3 Our holding that an intentional deprivation of property does not give 
rise to a violation of the Due Process Clause if the State provides an ade-
quate postdeprivation remedy was foreshadowed by our discussion of 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), in Parratt. We noted that our 
analysis was "quite consistent" with that in Ingraham, a case that, we ob-
served, involved intentional conduct on behalf of State officials. 451 
U. S. , at 542. 
/~ 
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Amendment rest not on the individual employee, but on the 
State. 
Respondent also contends, citing to Logan v. Zimmerman \ 
Brush Co., supra, that the deliberate destruction of his prop-
erty by petitioner constituted a due process violation despite 
the availability of postdeprivation remedies. Ibid. In Lo-
gan, we decided a question about which our decision in 
Parratt left little doubt, that is, whether a postdeprivation 
state remedy satisfies due process where the property depri-
vation is effected pursuant to an established state procedure. 
We held that it does not. Logan plainly has no relevance 
here. Respondent does not even allege that the asserted de- J 
struction of his property occurred pursuant to a state 
procedure. · 
Having determined that Parratt extends to intentional 
deprivations of property, we need only decide whether the 
Commonwealth of Virginia provides respondent an adequate 
postdeprivation remedy for the alleged destruction of his 
property. Both the District Court and, at least implicitly, 
the Court of Appeals held that several common law remedies 
available to respondent would provide adequate compensa-
tion for his property loss. We have no reason to question 
that determination, particularly given the speculative nature 
of respondent's arguments. 
Palmer does not seriously dispute the adequacy of the ex-
isting state law remedies themselves. He asserts in this re-
spect only that, because certain of his legal papers allegedly 
taken "may have contained things irreplacable [sic], and 
incompensable" or "may also have involved sentimental items 
which are of equally intangible value," Brief for Respondent 
10-11, n. 10, a suit in tort, for example, would not "necessar-
ily" compensate him fully. If the loss is "incompensable," 
this is as much so under§ 1983 as it would be under any other 
remedy. In any event, that Palmer might not be able tore-
cover under these remedies the full amount which he might 
receive in a § 1983 action is not, as we have said, determi-
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native of the adequacy of the State remedies. See Parratt, 
supra, at 544. 
Palmer contends also that relief under applicable State law 
"is far from certain and complete" because a state court 
might hold that petitioner, as a State employee, is entitled to 
sovereign immunity. Id., at 11. This suggestion is uncon-
vincing. The District Court and the Court of Appeals held 
that respondent's claim would not be barred by sovereign im-
munity. As the District Court noted, under Virginia law, "a 
State employee may be held liable for his intentional torts," 
Elder v. Holland, 208, Va. 15, 19, 155 S. E. 2d 369, 372-373 
(1967); see also Short v. Griffitts, 220 Va. 53, 255 S. E. 2d 479 
(1979). Indeed, respondent candidly acknowledges that it is 
"probable that a Virginia trial court would rule that there 
should be no immunity bar in the present case." ld., at 14. 
Respondent attempts to cast doubt on the obvious breadth 
of Elder through the naked assertion that "the phrase 'may 
be held liable' could have meant ... only the possibility of 
liability under certain circumstances rather than a blanket 
rule .... " I d., at 13. We are equally unpersuaded by this 
speculation. The language of Elder is unambiguous that em-
ployees of the Commonwealth do not enjoy sovereign immu-
nity for their intentional torts, and Elder has been so read by 
a number of federal courts, as respondent concedes, see Brief 
for Respondent 13, n. 13. See, e. g., Holmes v. Wampler, 
546 F. Supp. 500, 504 (ED Va. 1982); Irshad v. Spann, 543 F. 
Supp. 922, 928 (ED Va. 1982); Frazier v. Collins, 544 F. 
Supp. 109, 110 (ED Va. 1982); Whorley v. Karr, 534 F. Supp. 
88, 89 (WD Va. 1981); Daughtry v. Arlington County, Va., 
490 F. Supp. 307 (D DC 1980). 14 In sum, it is evident here, 
14 It is noteworthy that the Commonwealth has enacted the State Tort 
Claims Act, Va. Code §§ 8.01-195.1 et seq. (Supp. 1983), which, in defined 
circumstances, waives sovereign immunity. Additionally, as of October 
12, 1982, the State has in place an inmate grievance procedure that re-
ceived the certification of the Attorney General of the United States as in 
compliance with the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 
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as in Parratt, that the State has provided an adequate 
postdeprivation remedy for the alleged destruction of 
property. 
III 
We hold that a prisoner has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a prison cell and, therefore, that the Fourth 
Amendment has no applicability to a prison cell. We hold 
also that, even if petitioner intentionally destroyed respond-
ent's personal property during the challenged shakedown 
search, the destruction did not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment since the Commonwealth of Virginia has pro-
vided respondent an adequate postdeprivation remedy. 
Accordingly, the judgment .of the Court of Appeals revers-
ing and remanding the District Court's judgment on respond-
ent's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments claim is reversed. 
The judgment affirming the District Court's decision that re-
spondent has not been denied due process under the Four-
teenth Amendment is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
U. S. C. § 1997e (1976 ed. Supp. IV). Although apparently neither of 
these avenues was open to this respondent, both are potential sources of 
relief for persons in respondent's position in the future. 
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June 1, 1984 
Re: 82-1630 & 6695-Hudson v. Palmer 
Dear Chief: 
You have made a strong case for the holding that 
prisoners do not have any justifiable expectations of 
privacy, from which it follows that Palmer was not 
subjected to a "search" within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. That holding, however, does not 
dispose of this case. 
As you have pointed out in your recent circulation 
in Segura, and as the Court heJd in United States v. 
' Jacobsen, the Fourth Amendment protects not only 
p~rests, but also possessory interests. 
1 Hudson not only searchea-Pa mer s property, he then 
took and destroyed it. That deprived Palmer of his 
possessory interests in the property; under both Segura 
and Jacobsen, it was a "§-eizure." Moreover, the 
seizure was plainly unreasonable, at least on the 
present state of the record. There is no contention 
that Palmer's property was contraband; to the contrary 
the allegation is that Hudson took and destroyed the 
property maliciously, for no reason at all. I cannot 
but conclude that taking and destroying property a 
prisoner is entitled to have under relevant prison 
regulations is an unreasonable seizure prohibited by 
the Fourth Amendment. In due course I shall circulate 
a separate opinion. 
fully, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
• 
'" 
June 4, 1984 
82-1630 and 82-6695 Hudson 
Dear Chief: 
I agree that John has identified a question that 
should be answered, and thi.nk vour proposed addi.tional para-
graph is aopropriate. 
With this addition, I will be glad to ioin your 
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June 4, 1984 
.MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Re: 82-1630) 
82-6695) 
Hudson v. Palmer 
Palmer v. Hudson 
John raises an interesting point in his recent 
memorandum which may require a short response. I would 
propose that we deal with his point either in a short 
textual paragraph or a footnote and simply say that the 
same reasons that lead us to conclude that the Fourth 
Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches is 
inapplicable in a prison cell apply with controlling force 
to seizures. Arguably, prison officials could 
con~onally deny a prisoner all possessory interests 
in material personal possessions during the time of 
imprisonment. If so, it follows that . they must be free to 
seize from cells whatever articles in their view disserve 
legitimate institutional interests, unless a different 
constitutional right is thereby implicated. 
This power, as with all power, of course is subject 
to abuse. That the Fourth Amendment does not protect 
against seizures in a prison cell, however, does not mean 
that property can be destroyed by officials with impunity. 
When all is said and done, this is the · crux of 
respondent's complaint; his concern is plainly with the 
destruction, not with the seizure and we can concede that 
destruction raises a legitimate claim. But, as we have 
said, for destruction he has a state remedy, apart from 
inmate grievance procedures, which satisfies the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
I am ready to add a paragraph to this effect if this 
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Re: Nos. 82-1630 & 82-6695 Hudson v. Palmer 
~c');, 
1. You voted with the majority in this case. In your note 
recording your vote you said that the inmate's interest in priva-
cy with respect to property in his cell is "minimal." This opin-
ion holds that a prisoner has no expectation of privacy in his 
prison cell. P. 8. This seems close enough to your thinking on 
this issue to allow you to join the opinion (but see ,I 3 below) . 
2. However, you might wish to consider adding a short sepa-
rate opinion noting that the Court does not reach the question of 
whether a prisoner has privacy interests in his person that are 
protected by the Fourth Amendment. In your partial dissent in 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 u.s. 520, 563 (1979), you indicated that you 
recognized such interests for pretrial detainees: you dissented 
from the portion of the Court's opinion upholding body cavity 
searches because of "the serious intrusion on one's privacy ceca-
sioned by such a search." There is language in the Court's opin-
ion in that case that suggests that it also recognized such an 
interest. See id., at 560. If you wish to write a concurrence 
here is sample language: 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I join the Court's opinion with the understanding 
that it does not reach the question of whether a pris-
oner has legitimate interests in the privacy of his 
person, as opposed to his property. Searches and sei-
zures of the person raise considerations that are not 
~ 1')4 ~-4~ 
k6.~ 
~~ 
involved in this case. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 u.s.  
520, 563 (1979) (POWELL, J., dissenting in part); see~ ~ 
also id., at 560. 
i 
3. This op1n1on does not separately address the question of 
--------~--.:::-,-~ _..._ ______ --"" 
/( _ ~ 
~estruction of resp's property as opposed to mere search of it. 
Justice Stevens indicated in his memo of June 1, 1984, that he 
will write separately on this ground. In his view, the Fourth 
Amendment protects possessory interests as well as privacy inter-
ests. He will write that malicious destruction of property a 
prisoner is entitled to possess is unreasonable. Neither the 
briefs nor my bench memo separately addressed destruction of 
property as opposed to search, and I do not believe we discussed 
it prior to Conference. It is, however, an issue that is in the J J- I.A.- £AA..> 
case: the complaint and affidavits on summary judgment clearly ~ ~ 
mention the destruction of property, and the resp is entitled to 
urge affirmance on any ground supported by th~ record. ~ 
Justice Stevens's view has some appeal. It is true, as Jus-
tice Stevens says, that this Court has recognized that the Fourth 
Amendment protects possessory interests. E.g., us v. Jacobsen, 
slip op. at 14 (4/2/84); Texas v. Brown, 103 s.ct. 1535, 1541, 
and n.4 (1983). And malicious destruction of noncontraband prop-
erty certainly is unreasonable~he argument against JPS is as - - - -----follows. Simply because possessory interests are recognized as 
legitimate in the outside world does not mean that they should be 
in prisons. The same reasoning that justifies not applying the 
Fourth Amendment to searches also can be extended to seizures, 
although it is a closer case. Ferreting out contraband may fre-
quently mean seizing prisoners' property--even noncontraband 
property--for later investigation. Of course, it is hard to see 
how security interests could ever justify destruction of noncon-
traband property. But destruction of property is merely an ex-
treme form of seizure. See Jacobsen, supra, at 14-15. Its ef-----feet is little different than if the prison officials took and 
merely kept the seized goods. The fact that some seizures may be 
unreasonable does not justify a different result; some searches 
also may be unreasonable. The Court's opinion in effect draws a 
bright-line or prophylactic rule that all searches and seizures 
of property are permissible in prison. The proper remedy for 
destruction of property is a suit under the due process clause 
(which would be barred because state procedures provide an ade-
quate remedy) • 
Thus, the question is where the Court thinks the line should 
be drawn. Since the rule is essentially a prophylactic one, in-
tended to give prison authorities necessary flexibility, the 
line-drawing depends on how likely it is that seizures will be 
unreasonable when compared to the impingement placed on the au-
thor i ties' freedom of action. The line could be drawn between 
searches and seizures on the theory that seizures of noncontra-
band or questionable contraband are rarely necessary to security. 
Or the line could be drawn between destruction of property and 
seizures, since there is almost never any reason to destroy rath-
er than merely seize noncontraband property. My impression is 
that barring all Fourth Amendment claims is closest to your views 
-- ,. 
as expressed after Conference. This result is supported by an-
other consideration: in prison, all possessory or privacy inter-
ests in property are defined by administrative regulation. I 
7 
• suspect that prisons could bar possession of all property. That 
means that allowing any Fourth Amendment claim for searches or 
seizure of property in effect would constitutionalize the admin-
istrative regulations. Every violation of those regulations 
would raise a Fourth Amendment question. This seems like a bad 
idea to me. 
I think the Court's opinion should be I 
explicit that its reasoning about searches applies to seizures as 
If that is your view, 
well. That is not an obvious or a fortiori extension of what the 
opinion currently says, and the issue is in the case. Therefore, 
I recommend either that you await the dissent and whatever re-
sponse may be forthcoming, or that you join but suggest that the 
Chief make a response to JPS. A final possibility is that you 
circulate a concurrence like that above and say that you may have 
something further to say about the seizure issue after the dis-
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the privacy rationale which supports your holding 
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deprivations of the right to personally possess property. 
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its destruction, I think one moves from the Fourth Amendment to n 
the Fifth Amendment. I cannot imagine a taking of private property 
for public use which would be "reasonable" under some sort of 
Fourth Amendment analysis, and therefore not violative of the 
Fifth Amendment. But as you point out, Virginia provides a remedy 
for the destruction of the property. 
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cc: The Conference 









From: The Chief Justice 
Circulated: ________ _ 
Recirculated: JUN 1 5 1984 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 82-1630 AND 82-6695 
TED S. HUDSON, PETITIONER 
82-1630 v. 
RUSSELL THOMAS PALMER, JR. 
RUSSELL THOMAS PALMER, JR., PETITIONER 
82-6695 v. 
TED S. HUDSON 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1984] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari in No. 82-1630 to decide whether a 
prison inmate has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
prison cell entitling him to the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
We also granted certiorari in No. 82-6695, the cross-petition, 
to determine whether our decision in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 
U. S. 527 (1981), which held that a negligent deprivation of 
property by state officials does not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment if an adequate postdeprivation state remedy ex-
ists, should extend to intentional deprivations of property. 
I 
The facts underlying this dispute are relatively simple. 
Respondent Palmer is an inmate at the Bland Correctional 
Center in Bland, Va., serving sentences for forgery, utter-
ing, grand larceny, and bank robbery convictions. On Sep-
tember 16, 1981, petitioner Hudson, an officer at the Correc-
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tional Center, with a fellow officer, conducted a "shakedown" 
search of respondent's prison locker and cell for contraband. 
During the "shakedown," the officers discovered a ripped pil-
lowcase in a trashcan near respondent's cell bunk. Charges 
against Palmer were instituted under the prison disciplinary 
procedures for destroying state property. After a hearing, 
Palmer was found guilty on the charge and was ordered to 
reimburse the State for the cost of the material destroyed; in 
addition, a reprimand was entered on his prison record. 
Palmer subsequently brought this prose action in United 
States District Court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Respondent 
claimed that Hudson had conducted the shakedown search of 
his cell and had brought a false charge against him solely to 
harass him, and that, in violation of his Fourteenth Amend-
ment right not to be deprived of property without due proc-
ess of law, Hudson had intentionally destroyed certain of his 
noncontraband personal property during the September 16 
search. Hudson denied each allegation; he moved for and 
was granted summary judgment. The District Court ac-
cepted respondent's allegations as true but held nonetheless, 
relying on Parratt v. Taylor, supra, that the alleged destruc-
tion of respondent's property, even if intentional, did not vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment because there were state 
tort remedies available to redress the deprivation, App. 31 1 
and that the alleged harassment did not "rise to the level of a 
constitutional deprivation," id., at 32. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded for further proceedings. 697 F. 2d 1220 (CA4 
1983). The court affirmed the District Court's holding that 
respondent was not deprived of his property without due 
process. The court acknowledged that we considered only a 
1 The District Court determined that Palmer could proceed against Hud-
son in state court either for conversion or for detinue, and that under appli-
cable Virginia law, see Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 155 S. E. 2d 369 
(1967), Hudson would not be entitled to immunity for the alleged inten-
tional tort. 
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claim of negligent property deprivation in Parratt v. Taylor, 
supra. It agreed with the District Court, however, that the 
logic of Parratt applies equally to unauthorized intentional 
deprivations of property by state officials: "[O]nce it is as-
sumed that a postdeprivation remedy can cure an uninten-
tional but negligent act causing injury, inflicted by a state 
agent which is unamenable to prior review, then that princi-
ple applies as well to random and unauthorized intentional 
acts." 697 F. 2d, at 1223.2 The Court of Appeals did not 
discuss the availability and adequacy of existing state law 
remedies; it presumably accepted as correct the District 
Court's statement of the remedies available under Virginia 
law. 3 
The Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment on 
respondent's claim that the shakedown search was unreason-
able. The court recognized that Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 
520, 555-557 (1979), authorized irregular unannounced shake-
down searches of prison cells. But the court held that an in-
dividual prisoner has a "limited privacy right" in his cell enti-
tling him to protection against searches conducted solely to 
harass or to humiliate. 697 F. 2d, at 1225. 4 The shakedown 
2 The Court of Appeals observed that "there is no practical mechanism 
by which Virginia could prevent its guards from conducting personal ven-
dettas against prisoners other than by punishing them after the fact .. .. " 
697 F . 2d, at 1223. 
3 See n. 1, supra. 
• Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals' decision rests at least 
in part upon a finding of an independent right of privacy for prisoners 
under the Fourteenth Amendment alone. Arguably, it is not entirely 
clear whether the Court of Appeals believed that the limited privacy right 
it recognized was guaranteed solely by the Fourth Amendment, and appli-
cable to the States only through the Fourteenth Amendment, or whether 
the right emanated from the Fourteenth Amendment alone, or both. The 
court's opinion, however, explicitly speaks to the "primary purpose of the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments," 697 F. 2d, at 1224, and nowhere 
does it suggest an intention to draw a distinction between the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments right of privacy in prison cells. Under the cir-
cumstances, we assume, since there is no suggestion to the contrary, that 
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of a single prisoner's property, said the court, is permissible 
only if "done pursuant to an established program of conduct-
ing random searches of single cells or groups of cells reason-
ably designed to deter or discover the possession of contra-
band" or upon reasonable belief that the particular prisoner 
possessed contraband. I d., at 1224. Because the Court of 
Appeals concluded that the record reflected a factual dispute 
over whether the search of respondent's cell was routine or 
conducted to harass respondent, it held that summary judg-
ment was inappropriate, and that a remand was necessary to 
determine the purpose of the cell search. 
We granted certiorari. 463 U. S. -- (1983). We affirm 
in part and reverse in part. 
II 
A 
The first question we address is whether respondent has a 
right of privacy in his prison cell entitling him to the pro-
tection of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. 5 As we have noted, the Court of Ap-
peals held that the District Court's summary judgment in pe-
titioner's favor was premature because respondent had a 
"limited privacy right" in his cell that might have been 
breached. The court concluded that, to protect this privacy 
the court did not mean to imply in this context that any right of privacy 
that might exist under the Fourteenth Amendment alone exceeds that that 
exists under the Fourth Amendment. 
5 The majority of Courts of Appeals have held that a prisoner retains at 
least a minimal degree of Fourth Amendment protection in his cell. See 
United States v. Chamorro, 687 F. 2d 1 (CAl 1982); United States v. 
Hinckley, 217 App. D. C. 2672, 672 F. 2d 115 (1982); United States v. 
Lilly, 576 F. 2d 1240 (CA5 1978); United States v. Stumes, 549 F. 2d 831 
(CAB 1977); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F. 2d 1311 (CA7 1975), aff'd on re-
hearing, 545 F. 2d 565 (1976) (en bane), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 932 (1978). 
The Second and Ninth Circuits, however, have held that the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply in a prison cell. See United States v. Hitch-
cock, 467 F. 2d 1107 (CA9 1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 916 (1973); 
Christman v. Skinner, 468 F. 2d 723 (CA2 1972). 
,. 
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right, shakedown searches of an individual's cell should be 
performed only "pursuant to an established program of con-
ducting random searches 0 0 0 reasonably designed to deter or 
discover the possession of contraband" or upon reasonable 
belief that the prisoner possesses contraband. Petitioner 
contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that re-
spondent had even a limited privacy right in his cell, and 
urges that we adopt the "bright line" rule that prisoners have 
no legitimate expectation of privacy in their individual cells 
that would entitle them to Fourth Amendment protection. 
We have repeatedly held that prisons are not beyond the 
reach of the Constitution. No "iron curtain" separates one 
from the other. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 555 
(1974). Indeed, we have insisted that prisoners be accorded 
those rights not fundamentally inconsistent with imprison-
ment itself or incompatible with the objectives of incarcera-
tion. For example, we have held that invidious racial dis-
crimination is as intolerable within a prison as outside, except 
as may be essential to "prison security and discipline." Lee 
v. Washington, 390 U. S. 333 (1968) (per curiam). Like oth-
ers, prisoners have the constitutional right to petition the 
Government for redress of their grievances, which includes a 
reasonable right of access to the courts. Johnson v. Avery, 
393 u. s. 483 (1969). 
They must be provided "reasonable opportunities" to ex-
ercise their religious freedom guaranteed under the First 
Amendment. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319 (1972) (per cu-
riam). Similarly, prisoners retain those First Amendment 
rights of speech "not inconsistent with [their] status as ... 
prisoner[s] or with the legitimate penological objectives of 
the corrections system." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 
822 (1974). They enjoy the protection of due process. Wolff 
v. McDonnell, supra; Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 
(1972). And the Eighth Amendment ensures that they will 
not be subject to "cruel and unusual punishments." Estelle 
v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 (1976). The continuing guarantee of 
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these substantial rights to prison inmates is testimony to a 
belief that the way a society treats those who have trans-
gressed against it is evidence of the essential character of 
that society. 
However, while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many 
protections of the Constitution, it is also clear that imprison-
ment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many sig-
nificant rights. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 520, 545. 
These constraints on inmates, and in some cases the complete 
withdrawal of certain rights, are "justified by the consider-
ations underlying our penal system." Price v. Johnston, 334 
U. S. 266, 285 (1948); see also Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 
545-546 and cases cited; Wolffv. McDonnell, supra, at 555. 
The curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical 
matter, to accommodate a myriad of "institutional needs and 
objectives" of prison facilities, Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, at 
555, chief among which is internal security, see Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 823 (1974). Of course, these re-
strictions or retractions also serve, incidentally, as reminders 
that, under our system of justice, deterrence, and retribution 
are factors in addition to correction. 
We have not before been called upon to decide the specific 
question whether the Fourth Amendment applies within a 
prison cell, 6 but the nature of our inquiry is well defined. 
6 In Lanza v. New York, 370 U. S. 139, 143-144 (1962), a plurality of the 
Court termed as "at best a novel argument" the assertion that a prison "is a 
place where [one] can claim constitutional immunity from search or seizure 
of his person, his papers, or his effects." This observation, however, was 
plainly dictum. In fact, three Members of the Court specifically dissented 
from what they characterized as the Court's "gratuitous exposition of 
several grave constitutional issues .... " Id., at 150 (BRENNAN, J., 
dissenting). 
In upholding a room search rule against a Fourth Amendment challenge 
by pretrial detainees in Bell v. W oljish, the Court acknowledged the plau-
sibility of an argument that "a person confined in a detention facility has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his room or cell and that 
therefore the Fourth Amendment provides no protection for such a per-
.. 
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We must determine here, as in other Fourth Amendment 
contexts, if a "justifiable" expectation of privacy is at stake. 
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). The applicabil-
ity of the Fourth Amendment turns on whether "the person 
invoking its protection can claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' 
or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' that has been invaded 
by government action." Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 
740 (1979), and cases cited. We must decide, in Justice Har-
lan's words, whether a prisoner's expectation of privacy in 
his prison cell is the kind of expectation that "society is pre-
pared to recognize as 'reasonable."' Katz, supra, at 360, 361 
(concurring opinion)." 7 
Notwithstanding our caution in approaching claims that 
the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable in a given context, we 
son." 441 U. S., at 556-557. However, as in Lanza, it was unnecessary 
to reach the issue of the Fourth Amendment's general applicability in a 
prison cell. We simply assumed arguendo that a pretrial detainee re-
tained at least a "diminished expectation of privacy." !d., at 557. 
7 In Katz, Justice Harlan suggested that an expectation of privacy is 
"justifiable" if the person concerned has "exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy" and the expectation is one that "society is prepared 
to recognize as 'reasonable.'" 389 U.S., at 360, 361 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). The Court has always emphasized the second of these two require-
ments. As Justice White said, writing for the plurality in United States v. 
White, 401 U. S. 745 (1971), "[o]ur problem is not what the privacy expec-
tations of particular defendants in particular situations may be or the ex-
tent to which they may in fact have relied on the discretion of their com-
panions. . . . Our problem, in terms of the principles announced in Katz, 
is what expectations of privacy are constitutionally 'justifiable' .... " I d., 
at 751-752. In the same case, even Justice Harlan stressed the controlling 
importance of the second of these two requirements: "The analysis must, in 
my view, transcend the search for subjective expectations .... [W]e 
should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and risks without 
examining the desirability of saddling them upon society.'' United States 
v. White, 401 U. S., at 745, 768, 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
The Court's refusal to adopt a test of "subjective expectation" is under-
standable; constitutional rights are generally not defined by the subjective 
intent of those asserting the rights. The problems inherent in such a 
standard are self-evident. See, e. g., Smith v. Maryland, supra, at 740-
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hold that society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate 
any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might 
have in his prison cell and that accordingly, the Fourth ' 
Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does 
not apply within the confines of the prison cell. The recogni-
tion of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells 
simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarceration 
and the needs and objectives of penal institutions. 
Prisons, by definition, are places of involuntary confine-
ment of persons who have a demonstrated proclivity for anti-
social criminal, and often violent, conduct. Inmates have 
necessarily shown a lapse in ability to control and conform 
their behavior to the legitimate standards of society by the 
normal impulses of self-restraint; they have shown an inabil-
ity to regulate their conduct in a way that reflects either a 
respect for law or an appreciation of the rights of others. 
Even a partial survey of the statistics on violent crime in our 
Nation's prisons illustrates the magnitude of the problem. 
During 1981 and the first half of 1982, there were over 120 
prisoners murdered by fellow inmates in state and federal 
prisons. A number of prison personnel were murdered by 
prisoners during this period. Over 29 riots or similar distur-
bances were reported in these facilities for the same time 
frame. And there were over 125 suicides in these institu-
tions. See Prison Violence 7 Corrections Compendium 
(Mar. 1983). Additionally, informal statistics from the U. S. 
Bureau of Prisons show that in the federal system during 
1983, there were 11 inmate homicides, 359 inmate assaults on 
other inmates, 227 inmate assaults on prison staff, and 10 sui-
cides. There were in the same system in 1981 and 1982 over 
750 inmate assaults on other inmates and over 570 inmate as-
saults on prison personnel. 
741 , n. 5. 
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Within this volatile "community," prison administrators 
are to take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of not only 
the prison staffs and administrative personnel, but visitors. 
They are under an obligation to take reasonable measures to 
guarantee the safety of the inmates themselves. They must 
be ever alert to attempts to introduce drugs and other con-
traband into the premises which, we can judicially notice, is 
one of the most perplexing problems of prisons today; they 
must prevent, so far as possible, the flow of illicit weapons 
into the prison; they must be vigilant to detect escape plots, 
in which drugs or weapons may be involved, before the 
schemes materialize. In addition to these monumental 
tasks, it is incumbent upon these officials at the same time to 
maintain as sanitary an environment for the inmates as feasi-
ble, given the difficulties of the environment. 
The administration of a prison, we have said, is "at best an 
extraordinarily difficult undertaking." Wolffv. McDonnell, 
418 U. S., at 566; Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460, --
(1983). But it would be literally impossible to accomplish the 
prison objectives identified above if inmates retained a right 
of privacy in their cells. Virtually the only place inmates can 
conceal weapons, drugs, and other contraband is in their 
cells. Unfettered access to these cells by prison officials, 
thus, is imperative if drugs and contraband are to be 
ferretted out and sanitary surroundings are to be maintained. 
Determining whether an expectation of privacy is "legiti-
mate" or "reasonable" necessarily entails a balancing of inter-
ests. The two interests here, of course, are the interest of 
society in the security of its penal institutions and the inter-
est of the prisoner in privacy within his cell, which is already 
limited by the exigencies of the circumstances. We strike 
the balance in favor of institutional security, which we have 
noted is "central to all other corrections goals," Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U. S., at 823. A right of privacy in tradi-
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tional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompati-
ble with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and 
their cells required to ensure institutional security and inter-
nal order. 8 We are satisfied that society would insist that 
the prisoner's expectation of privacy always yield to what 
must be considered the paramount interest in institutional se-
curity; a prison "shares none of the attributes of privacy of a 
home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel room." Lanza v. 
New York, 370 U. S. 139, 143-144 (1962). We believe that it 
is accepted by our society that "[l]oss of freedom of choice and 
privacy are inherent incidents of confinement." Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U. 8., at 537. 
The Court of Appeals was troubled by the possibility of 
searches conducted solely to harass inmates; it reasoned that 
a requirement that searches be conducted only pursuant to 
an established policy or upon reasonable suspicion would pre-
vent such searches to the maximum extent possible. Of 
course, there is a risk of maliciously motivated searches, and 
of course, intentional harassment of even the most hardened 
criminals cannot be tolerated by a civilized society. How-
ever, we disagree with the court's proposed solution. The 
uncertainty that attends random searches of cells renders 
these searches perhaps the most effective weapon of the 
8 Respondent contends also that the destruction of his personal property 
constituted an unreasonable seizure of that property violative of the 
Fourth Amendment. Assuming that the Fourth Amendment protects 
against the destruction of property, in addition to its mere seizure, the 
same reasons that lead us to conclude that the Fourth Amendment's pro-
scription against unreasonable searches is inapplicable in a prison cell, 
apply with controlling force to seizures. Prison officials must be free to 
seize from cells any articles which, in their view, disserve legitimate insti-
tutional interests. 
That the Fourth Amendment does not protect against seizures in a 
prison cell does not mean that an inmate's property can be destroyed with 
impunity. We note, for example, that even apart from inmate grievance 
procedures, see n. 9, infra, respondent has adequate state remedies for 
the alleged destruction of his property. See discussion infra, at 16-18. 
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prison administrator in the constant fight against the prolif-
eration of knives and guns, illicit drugs, and other contra-
band. The Court of Appeals candidly acknowledged that 
"the device [of random cell searches] is of ... obvious utility 
in achieving the goal of prison security." 697 F. 2d, at 1224. 
A requirement that even random searches be conducted 
pursuant to an established plan would seriously underririne 
the effectiveness of this weapon. It is naive to believe that 
prisoners would not eventually decipher any plan officials 
might devise for "planned random searches," and thus be 
able routinely to anticipate searches. The Supreme Court of 
Virginia identified the shortcomings of an approach such as 
that adopted by the Court of Appeals and the necessity of al-
lowing prison administrators flexibility: 
"For one to advocate that prison searches must be con-
ducted only pursuant to an enunciated general policy or 
when suspicion is directed at a particular inmate is to ig-
nore the realities of prison operation. Random searches 
of inmates, individually or collectively, and their cells 
and lockers are valid and necessary to ensure the secu-
rity of the institution and the safety of inmates and all 
others within its boundaries. This type of search allows 
prison officers flexibility and prevents inmates from 
anticipating, and thereby thwarting, a search for contra-
band." Marrero v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 754, 757, 
284 S. E. 2d 809, 811 (1981). 
We share the concerns so well expressed by the Supreme 
Court and its view that wholly random searches are essential 
to the effective security of penal institutions. We, there-
fore, cannot accept even the concededly limited holding of the 
Court of Appeals. 
Respondent acknowledges that routine shakedowns of 
prison cells are essential to the effective administration of 
prisons. Brief for Respondent 7, n. 5. He contends, how-
ever, that he is constitutionally entitled not to be subjected to 
searches conducted only to harass. The crux of his claim is 
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that "because searches and seizures to harass are unreason-
able, a prisoner has a reasonable expectation of privacy not to 
have his cell, locker, personal effects, person invaded for 
such a purpose." Brief for Respondent 24. This argument, 
which assumes the answer to the predicate question whether 
a prisoner has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his 
prison cell at all, is merely a challenge to the reasonableness 
of the particular search of respondent's cell. Because we 
conclude that prisoners have no legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy and that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unrea- \ 
sonable searches does not apply in prison cells, we need not 
address this issue. 
Our holding that respondent does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy enabling him to invoke the protections 
of the Fourth Amendment does not mean that he is without a 
remedy for calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs. 
Nor does it mean that prison attendants can ride roughshod 
over inmates' property rights with impunity. The Eighth 
Amendment always stands as a protection against "cruel and 
unusual punishments." By the same token, there are ade-
quate state tort and common-law remedies available to re-
spondent to redress the alleged destruction of his personal 
property. See discussion infra, at 16-18.9 
B 
In his complaint in the District Court, in addition to his 
claim that the shakedown search of his cell violated his 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment privacy rights, respond-
ent alleged under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 that petitioner intention-
ally destroyed certain of his personal property during the 
search. This destruction, respondent contended, deprived 
him of property without due process, in violation of the Due 
9 The Commonwealth has a new inmate grievance procedure that was 
effective as of October 12, 1982, see n. 14, infra. But it appears that at 
the time of the alleged deprivation of respondent's property, a very similar 
procedure was in effect that would also have afforded respondent relief for 
any destruction of his property. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 13, n. 14. 
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District 
Court dismissed this portion of respondent's complaint for 
failure to state a claim. Reasoning under Parratt v. Taylor, 
451 U. S. 527 (1981), it held that even an intentional destruc-
tion of property by a state employee does not violate due 
process if the state provides a meaningful postdeprivation 
remedy. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The question pre-
sented for our review in Palmer's cross-petition is whether 
our decision in Parratt v. Taylor should extend, as the Court 
of Appeals held, to intentional deprivations of property by 
state employees acting under color of state law. 10 
In Parratt v. Taylor, a state prisoner sued prison officials 
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging that their negligent loss of 
a hobby kit he ordered from a mail-order catalogue deprived 
him of property without due process of law, in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit had affirmed the District Court's summary 
judgment in the prisoner's favor. We reversed, holding that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not 
violated when a state employee negligently deprives an indi-
vidual of property, provided that the State makes available a 
meaningful postdeprivation remedy. 11 
We viewed our decision in Parratt as consistent with prior 
cases recognizing that 
1° Four Circuits, including the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in this 
case, have held that Parratt extends to intentional deprivations of prop-
erty. See Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F. 2d 864 (CA7 1983); Engblom v. 
Carey, 677 F. 2d 957 (CA2 1982); Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 
660 F. 2d 1345 (CA9 1981), aff'd sub nom. Rutledge v. Kush, 460 U. S. 
- (1983). Three Circuits have held that it does not. Brewer v. Black-
well, 692 F. 2d 387 (CA5 1982); Weiss v. Lehman, 676 F. 2d 1320 (CA9 
1982); Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F. 2d 868 (CA7 1981). 
11 Nebraska had provided respondent with a tort remedy for his alleged 
property deprivation. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-8,209 et seq. (1976). We held 
that this remedy was entirely adequate to satisfy due process, even 
though we recognized that it might not provide respondent all the relief to 
which he might have been entitled under § 1983. 451 U. S. , at 543-544. 
14 
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"either the necessity of quick action by the State or the 
impracticability of providing any meaningful predepriva-
tion process, when coupled with the availability of some 
meaningful means by which to assess the propriety of 
the State's action at some time after the initial taking 
. . . satisf[ies] the requirements of procedural due proc-
ess." 451 U. S., at 539 (footnote omitted). 
We reasoned that where a loss of property is occasioned by a 
random, unauthorized act by a state employee, rather than 
by an established state procedure, the state cannot predict 
when the loss will occur. Id., at 541. Under these circum-
stances, we observed: 
"[It]t is difficult to conceive of how the State could pro-
vide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation takes 
place. The loss of property, although attributable to the 
State as action under 'color of law,' is in almost all cases 
beyond the control of the State. Indeed, in most cases 
it is not only impracticable, but impossible, to provide a 
meaningful hearing before the deprivation." Ibid. 12 
Two Terms ago, we reaffirmed our holding in Parratt in 
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422 (1982), in 
the course of holding that postdeprivation remedies do not 
satisfy due process where a deprivation of property is caused 
by conduct pursuant to established state procedure, rather 
than random and unauthorized action. 13 
12 In reaching our conclusion in Parratt, we expressly relied on then-
Judge Stevens' opinion for the Seventh Circuit in Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 
F. 2d 1311 (1975), modified en bane, 545 F. 2d 565 (1976), cert. denied, 435 
U. S. 932 (1978), holding that, where an individual has been negligently de-
prived of property by a state employee, the State's action is not complete 
unless or until the State fails to provide an adequate postdeprivation rem-
edy for the property loss. 451 U. S., at 541-542. 
13 In Logan, we examined a claim that the terms of an Illinois statute 
deprived the petitioner of an opportunity to pursue his employment dis-
crimination claim. We specifically distinguished the case from Parratt by 
noting that "Parratt ... was dealing with a ... 'random and unauthorized 
act by a state employee ... [and was] not a result of some established state 
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While Parratt is necessarily limited by its facts to negli-
gent deprivations of property, it is evident, as the Court of 
Appeals recognized, that its reasoning applies as well to in-
tentional deprivations of property. The underlying rationale 
of Parratt is that when deprivations of property are effected 
through random and unauthorized conduct of a state em-
ployee, predeprivation procedures are simply "impracticable" 
since the state cannot know when such deprivations will 
occur. We can discern no logical distinction between negli-
gent and intentional deprivations of property insofar as the 
"practicability" of affording predeprivation process is con-
cerned. The State can no more anticipate and control in ad-
vance the random and unauthorized intentional conduct of its 
employees than it can anticipate similar negligent conduct. 
Arguably, intentional acts are even more difficult to antici-
pate because one bent on intentionally depriving a person of 
his property might well take affirmative steps to avoid sig-
nalling his intent. 
If negligent deprivations of property do not violate the Due 
Process Clause because predeprivation process is impracti-
cable, it follows that intentional deprivations do not violate 
that Clause provided, of course, that adequate state post-
deprivation remedies are available. Accordingly, we hold 
that an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a 
state employee does not constitute a violation of the proce-1 
dural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy 
for the loss is available. For intentional, as for negligent 
deprivations of property by state employees, the State's ac-
tion is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses to 
procedure.'" 455 U.S., at 435-436 (quoting Parratt, supra, at 541). 
Parratt, we said, "was not designed to reach ... a situation" where the 
deprivation is the result of an established state procedure. 455 U. S., at 
436. 
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provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy. 14 
Respondent presses two arguments that require at least 
brief comment. First, he contends that, because an agent of 
the state who intends to deprive a person of his property 
"can provide predeprivation process, then as a matter of due 
process he must do so." Brief for Respondent 8 (emphasis in 
original). This argument reflects a fundamental misunder-
standing of Parratt. There we held that postdeprivation 
procedures satisfy due process because the State cannot pos-
sibly know in advance of a negligent deprivation of property. 
Whether an individual employee himself is able to foresee a 
deprivation is simply of no consequence. The controlling in-
quiry is solely whether the State is in a position to provide for 
predeprivation process. l oMc~:Sto,J 
Respondent also contends, citing to Logan v. Zimmerman 
Brush Co., supra, that the deliberate destruction of his 
property by petitioner constituted a due process violation de-
spite the availability of postdeprivation remedies. Ibid. In 
Logan, we decided a question about which our decision in 
Parratt left little doubt, that is, whether a postdeprivation 
state remedy satisfies due process where the property depri-
vation is effected pursuant to an established state procedure. 
We held that it does not. Logan plainly has no relevance 
here. Respondent does not even allege that the asserted 
destruction of his property occurred pursuant to a state 
procedure. 
Having determined that Parratt extends to intentional 
deprivations of property, we need only decide whether the 
Commonwealth of Virginia provides respondent an adequate 
14 Our holding that an intentional deprivation of property does not give 
rise to a violation of the Due Process Clause if the State provides an ade-
quate postdeprivation remedy was foreshadowed by our discussion of 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), in Parratt. We noted that our 
analysis was "quite consistent" with that in Ingraham, a case that, we ob-
served, involved intentional conduct on behalf of state officials. 451 U. S., 
at 542. 
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postdeprivation remedy for the alleged destruction of his 
property. Both the District Court and, at least implicitly, 
the Court of Appeals held that several common-law remedies 
available to respondent would provide adequate compensa-
tion for his property loss. We have no reason to question 
that determination, particularly given the speculative nature 
of respondent's arguments. 
Palmer does not seriously dispute the adequacy of the ex-
isting state-law remedies themselves. He asserts in this re-
spect only that, because certain of his legal papers allegedly 
taken "may have contained things irreplacable [sic], and 
incompensable" or "may also have involved sentimental items 
which are of equally intangible value," Brief for Respondent 
10-11, n. 10, a suit in tort, for example, would not "necessar-
ily" compensate him fully. If the loss is "incompensable," 
this is as much so under§ 1983 as it would be under any other 
remedy. In any event, that Palmer might not be able to re-
cover under these remedies the full amount which he might 
receive in a § 1983 action is not, as we have said, determi-
native of the adequacy of the state remedies. See Parratt, 
supra, at 544. 
Palmer contends also that relief under applicable state law 
"is far from certain and complete" because a state court 
might hold that petitioner, as a state employee, is entitled to 
sovereign immunity. Brief for Respondent 11. This sug-
gestion is unconvincing. The District Court and the Court of 
Appeals held that respondent's claim would not be barred by 
sovereign immunity. As the District Court noted, under 
Virginia law, "a State employee may be held liable for his in-
tentional torts," Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 19, 155 S. E. 
2d 369, 372-373 (1967); see also Short v. Griffitts, 220 Va. 53, 
255 S. E. 2d 479 (1979). Indeed, respondent candidly ac-
knowledges that it is "probable that a Virginia trial court 
would rule that there should be no immunity bar in the 
present case." Brief for Respondent 14. 
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Respondent attempts to cast doubt on the obvious breadth 
of Elder through the naked assertion that "the phrase 'may 
be held liable' could have meant ... only the possibility of li-
ability under certain circumstances rather than a blanket rule 
" I d., at 13. We are equally unpersuaded by this 
speculation. The language of Elder is unambiguous that em-
ployees of the Commonwealth do not enjoy sovereign immu-
nity for their intentional torts, and Elder has been so read by 
a number of federal courts, as respondent concedes, see Brief 
for Respondent 13, n. 13. See, e. g., Holmes v. Wampler, 
546 F. Supp. 500, 504 (ED Va. 1982); Irshad v. Spann, 543 F. 
Supp. 922, 928 (ED Va. 1982); Frazier v. Collins, 544 F. 
Supp. 109, 110 (ED Va. 1982); Whorley v. Karr, 534 F. Supp. 
88, 89 (WD Va. 1981); Daughtry v. Arlington County, Va., 
490 F. Supp. 307 (DC 1980). 15 In sum, it is evident here, as 
in Parratt, that the State has provided an adequate post-
deprivation remedy for the alleged destruction of property. 
III 
We hold that the Fourth Amendment has no applicability \ 
to a prison cell. We hold also that, even if petitioner inten-
tionally destroyed respondent's personal property during the 
challenged shakedown search, the destruction did not violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment since the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia has provided respondent an adequate postdeprivation 
remedy. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals revers-
ing and remanding the District Court's judgment on respond-
15 It is noteworthy that the Commonwealth has enacted the State Tort 
Claims Act, Va. Code §§ 8.01-195.1 et seq. (Supp. 1983), which, in defined 
circumstances, waives sovereign immunity. Additionally, as of October 
12, 1982, the State has in place an inmate grievance procedure that re-
ceived the certification of the Attorney General of the United States as in 
compliance with the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 
U. S. C.§ 1997e. Although apparently neither of these avenues was open 
to this respondent, both are potential sources of relief for persons in re-
spondent's position in the future. 
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ent's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments claim is reversed. 
The judgment affirming the District Court's decision that re-
spondent has not been denied due process under the Four-
teenth Amendment is affirmed. 
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JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
This case comes to us on the pleadings. We must take the 
allegations in Palmer's complaint as true. 1 Liberally con-
struing this pro se complaint as we must, 2 it alleges that 
after examining it, prison guard Hudson maliciously took and 
destroyed a quantity of Palmer's property, including legal 
materials and letters, for no reason other than harassment. 3 
1 See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U. S. 5, 10 (1980) (per curiam); California 
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 515-516 
(1972); Walker Process Equipment Co. v. Food Machinery & Chemical 
Corp., 382 U. S. 172, 174-175 (1965); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U. S. 546 (1964) 
(per curiam). 
2 See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U. S. 364 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. 
Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972) (per curiam). 
8 "On 9-16-81 around 5:50 p.m., officer Hudson shook down my locker 
and destroyed a lot of my property, i. e.: legal materials, letters, and other 
personal property only as a means of harassment. Officer Hudson has vio-
lated my Constitutional rights. The shakedown was no routine shake-
down. It was planned and carried out only as harassment. Hudson 
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For the reasons stated in Part II-B of the opinion of the 
Court, I agree that Palmer's complaint does not allege a vi-
olation of his constitutional right to procedural due process. 4 
The reasoning in Part II-A of the Court's opinion, however, 
is seriously flawed-indeed, internally inconsistent. The 
Court correctly concludes that the imperatives of prison ad-
ministration require random searches of prison cells, and also 
correctly states that in the prison context "[o]f course, there 
is a risk of maliciously motivated searches, and of course, in-
tentional harassment of even the most hardened criminals 
cannot be tolerated by a civilized society." Ante, at 10. 
But the Court then holds that no matter how malicious, de-
structive or arbitrary a cell search and seizure may be, it can-
not constitute an unreasonable invasion of any privacy or pos-
sessory interest that society is prepared to recognize. Ante, 
at 8. 
Measured by the conditions that prevail in a free society, 
neither the possessions nor the slight residuum of privacy 
that a prison inmate can retain in his cell, can have more than 
the most minimal value. From the standpoint of the pris-
oner, however, that trivial residuum may mark the difference 
between slavery and humanity. On another occasion, THE 
CHIEF JUSTICE wrote: 
stated the next time he would really mess my stuff up. I have plenty of 
witnesses to these facts." App. 7-8. 
'I join Part 11-B of the opinion of the Court on the understanding that it 
simply applies the holding of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981), to the 
facts of this case. I do not understand the Court's holding to apply to con-
duct that violates a substantive constitutional right-actions governmental 
officials may not take no matter what procedural protections accompany 
them, see Parratt, 451 U. S., at 545 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring); see also 
id., at 552-553 (POWELL, J., concurring in result); or to cases in which it is 
contended that the established prison procedures themselves create an un-
reasonable risk that prisoners will be unjustifiably deprived of their prop-
erty, see id., at 543; see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 
422, 435-436 (1982). 
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"It is true that inmates lose many rights when they are 
lawfully confined, but they do not lose all civil rights. 
Inmates in jails, prisons, or mental institutional retain 
certain fundamental rights of privacy; they are not like 
animals in a zoo to be filmed and photographed at will by 
the public or by media reporters, however 'educational' 
the process may be for others." Houchins v. KQED, 
Inc., 438 U. S. 1, 5, n. 2 (1978) (plurality opinion) (cita-
tion omitted). · 
Personal letters, snapshots of family members, a souvenir, 
a deck of cards, a hobby kit, perhaps a diary or a training 
manual for an apprentice in a new trade, or even a Bible-a 
variety of inexpensive items may enable a prisoner to main-
tain contact with some part of his past and an eye to the pos-
sibility of a better future. Are all of these items subject to 
unrestrained perusal, confiscation or mutilation at the hands 
of a possibly hostile guard? Is the Court correct in its per-
ception that "society'' is not prepared to recognize any pri-
vacy or possessory interest of the prison inmate-no matter 
how remote the threat to prison security may be? 
I 
Even if it is assumed that Hudson had no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in most of the property at issue in this case 
because it could be inspected at any time, that does not mean 
he was without Fourth Amendment protection. 5 For the 
Fourth Amendment protects Palmer's possessory interests 
5 Though I am willing to assume that for purposes of this case that the 
Court's holding concerning most of Palmer's privacy interests is correct, 
that should not be taken as an endorsement of the Court's new "bright line" 
rule that a prisoner can have no expecation of privacy in his papers or ef-
fects, ante, at 5. I cannot see any justification for applying this rule to 
minimum security facilities in which inmates who pose no realistic threat to 
security are housed. I also see no justification for reading the mail of a 
prisoner once it has cleared whatever censorship mechanism is employed 
by the prison and has been received by the prisoner. 
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in this property entirely apart from whatever privacy inter-
est he may have in it. 
"The first clause of the Fourth Amendment provides 
that the 'right of the people to be secure in their prsons, 
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... ' This 
text protects two kinds of expectations, one involving 
'searches,' the other 'seizures.' A 'search' occurs when 
an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to con-
sider reasonable is infringed. A 'seizure' of property oc-
curs when there is some meaningful interference with an 
individual's possessory interests in that property." 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. --, -- (1984) 
(footnotes omitted). 6 
There can be no doubt that the complaint adequately al-
leges a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Palmer was completely deprived of his possessory in-
terests in his property; by taking and destroying it, Hudson 
was asserting "dominion and control" over it in the most fun-
damental sense; hence his conduct "did constitute a seizure," 
id., at --.7 The fact that the property was destroyed 
hardly alters the analysis-the possessory interests the 
Fourth Amendment protects are those of the citizen. From 
the citizen's standpoint, it makes no difference what the gov-
ernment does with his property once it takes it from him; he 
is just as much deprived of his possessory interests when it is 
destroyed as when it is merely taken. This very Term, in 
Jacobsen, we squarely held that destruction of property in a 
field test for cocaine constituted a constitutionally cognizable 
interference with possessory interests: "[T]he field test did 
6 See also Segura v. United States, ante, at - (opinion of BURGER, 
C. J.); United States v. Place, 462 U. S. - (1982); id., at- (BREN-
NAN, J., concurring in result); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.-,- (1983) 
(STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). 
7 See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 574-575 (1979) (MARSHALL, J., 
dissenting). 
82-1630 & 82-6695--CONCUR/DISSENT 
HUDSON v. PALMER 5 
affect respondents' possessory interests protected by the 
[Fourth] Amendment, since by destroying a quantity of the 
powder it converted what had been only a temporary depri-
vation of possessory interests into a permanent one." I d., at 
The Court suggests that "the interest of society in the se-
curity of its penal insitututions" precludes prisoners from 
having any legitimate possessory interests. Ante, at 9-10 
and n. · 8. 8 That contention is fundamentally wrong for at 
least two reasons. 
First, Palmer's possession of the material was entirely le-
gitimate as a matter of state law. There is no contention 
that the material seized was contraband or that Palmer's pos-
session of it was in any way inconsistent with applicable 
prison regulations. Hence, he had an entirely legitimate 
right to possess it. In fact, the Court's analysis of Palmer's 
possessory interests is at odds with its treatment of his Due 
Process claim. In Part 11-B of its opinion, the Court holds 
that the material which Hudson took and destroyed was 
"property" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. 
Ante, at 15-16. Indeed, this holding is compelled by Parratt 
v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981), in which we held that a 
$23.50 hobby kit which had been mail ordered but not re-
ceived by a prisoner was "property" within the meaning of 
the Due Process Clause. See id., at 536. 9 However, an in-
8 The existence of state remedies for this seizure, to which the Court ad-
verts ante, at 10, n. 8, is of course irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment 
question, since 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides a remedy for Fourth Amend-
ment violations supplemental to any state remedy that may exist. M on-
roe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 183 (1961). See Patsy v. Florida Board of Re-
gents, 457 U. S. 496 (1982); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. 
McNary, 454 U. S. 100, 104 (1981); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 99 
(1980); Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 710, n. 5 (1976); Wilwording v. 
Swenson, 404 U. S. 249, 251 (1971) (per curiam); McNeese v. Board of 
Education, 373 U. S. 668, 671-674 (1963). See also n. 4, supra. 
9 0n this point, the Court was unanimous, see 451 U. S., at 546-548 
(POWELL, J., concurring in result), as it is today. 
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terest cannot qualify as "property" within the meaning of the 
Due Process Clause unless it amounts to a legitimate claim of 
entitlement. 10 Thus in Part li-B of its opinion the Court 
necessarily indicates that Palmer had a legitimate claim of 
entitlement to the material at issue. It is well-settled that 
once a State creates such a constitutionally protected inter-
est, the Constitution forbids it from depriving even a pris-
oner of such an interest arbitrarily. 11 Thus, Palmer had ale-
gitimate right under both state law and the Due Process 
Clause to possess the material at issue. That being the case, ) 
the Court's own analysis indicates that ·Palmer had a legiti- ( 
mate possessory interest in the material within the Fourth 
Amendment's proscription on unreasonable seizures. 
Second, the most significant of Palmer's possessory inter-
ests are protected as a matter of substantive constitutional 
law, entirely apart from the legitimacy of those interests 
under state law or the Due Process Clause. The Eighth 
Amendment forbids "cruel and unusual punishments." Its 
proscriptions are measured by society's "evolving standards 
of decency," Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, 346-347 
(1981); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 102-103 (1977). The 
Court's implication that prisoners have no possessory inter-
ests that by virtue of the Fourth Amendment are free from 
State interference cannot, in my view, be squared with the 
Eighth Amendment. To hold that a prisoner's possession of 
10 See, e. g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., ante, at -; Logan v. 
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, 430-431 (1982); Webb's Fabulous 
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U. S. 155, 161 (1980); Greenholtz v. Ne-
braska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 7 (1979); Leis v. Flynt, 439 U. S. 438, 
441-443 (1979) (per curiam); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 344 and nn. 
6-7 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 165-166 (1974) (POWELL, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in result in part); id. , at 185 (WHITE, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id., at 207-208 (MARSHALL, J., 
dissenting); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972). 
11 See Hewitt v. Helms , 459 U. S.-,- (1983); Greenholtz v. Ne-
braska Penal Inmates , 442 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1979); Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 
u. s. 539, 556-558 (1974). 
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a letter from his wife, or a picture of his baby, has no protec-
tion against arbitrary or malicious seizure and destruction 
would not, in my judgment, comport with any civilized stand-
ard of decency. 
There are other substantive constitutional rights that also 
shed light on the legitimacy of Palmer's possessory interests. 
The complaint alleges that the material at issue includes let-
ters and legal materials. This Court has held the First 
Amendment entitles a prisoner to receive and send mail, sub-
ject only to the institution's right to censor letters or with-
hold delivery if necessary to protect institutional security, 
and if accompanied by procedural safeguards. 12 We have 
also held that the Fourteenth Amendment entitles a prisoner 
to reasonable access to legal materials as a corollary of the 
constitutional right of access to the courts. 13 Thus, these 
substantive constitutional rights affirmatively protect Palm-
er's right to possess the material in question free from state 
interference. It is therefore beyond me how that Court can 
question the legitimacy of Palmer's possessory interests 
which were so clearly infringed by Hudson's alleged conduct. 
II 
Once it is concluded that Palmer has adequately alleged a 
"seizure," the question becomes whether the seizure was "un-
reasonable." Questions of Fourth Amendment reasonable-
ness can be resolved only by balancing the intrusion on con-
stitutionally protected interests against the law enforcement 
interests justifying the challenged conduct. 14 
12 See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396 (1974). A prisoner's posses-
sion of other types of personal property relating to religious observance, 
such as a Bible or a crucifix, is surely protected by the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment. See Cruz v. Beta, 405 U. S. 319, 322, n. 
2 (1972) (per curiam). 
13 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U. S. 817 (1977). 
14 See, e. g., Jacobsen, 466 U.S., at-; Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 
- , - (1983); United States v. Place, 462 U. S. - , - (1983); Bell 
v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 559 (1979). 
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It is well-settled that the discretion accorded prison offi-
cials is not absolute. 15 A prisoner retains those constitu-
tional rights not inconsistent with legitimate penological ob-
jectives. 16 There can be no penological justification for the 
seizure alleged here. There is no contention that Palmer's 
property posed any threat to institutional security. Hudson 
had already examined the material before he took and de-
stroyed it. The allegation is that Hudson did this for no rea-
15 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 562 (1979); Procunier v. Martinez, 
416 U. S. 396, 405-406 (1974); Cruz v. Beta, 405 U. S. 319, 321-322 (1972) 
(per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 319, 321-322 (1972) (per 
curiam). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, 352 (1981); id., at 
368-369 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
U. S. 97, 102-105 (1976); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U. S. 843, 
866-870 (1974) (POWELL, J., dissenting). 
16 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 545-547 (1979); Jones v. North Car-
olina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U. S. 119, 125, 129 (1977); Wolffv. Mc-
Donnell, 418 U. S. 539, 555-556 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 
822 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 412-414 (1974). No 
precedent of this Court indicates that this general principle is inapplicable 
to the Fourth Amendment. As the Court acknowledges, statements con-
cerning the application of the Fourth Amendment to prisons in Lanza v. 
New York, 370 U. S. 139, 143-144 (1962), were dicta and were not joined 
by a majority of the Court. See ante, at 6-7, n. 6. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U. S. 520 (1979), the Court explicitly reserved questions concerning pris-
oners' expectations of privacy and the seizure and destruction of prisoners' 
property. See id., at 556-557 and n. 38. In United States v. Edwards, 
415 U. S. 800 (1974), we approved "no more than taking from [an arrestee] 
the effects in his immediate possession that constituted evidence of a 
crime," id., at 805, and reserved decision on the question presented here, 
see id., at 808, n. 9. Conversely, when this Court last confronted the 
question decided today, it took it as given that the seizure of a prisoner's 
letters was subject to the Fourth Amendment: 
"[T]he letters were voluntarily written, no threat or coercion was used to 
obtain them, nor were they seized without process. They came into the 
possession of the officials of the penitentiary under established practice, 
reasonably designed to promote the discipline of the institution. Under 
such circumstances there was neither testimony required of the accused, 
nor unreasonable search and seizure in violation of his constitutional 
rights." Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 15, 21-22 (1919). 
,. 
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son save spite; there is no contention that under prison regu-
lations the material was contraband, and in any event as I 
have indicated above the Constitution prohibits a State from 
treating letters and legal materials as contraband. The 
Court agrees that intentional harassment of prisoners by 
guards is intolerable, ante, at 10. That being the case, there 
is no room for any conclusion but that the alleged seizure was 
unreasonable. The need for "close and continual surveil-
lance of inmates and their cells," ante, at 10, in no way justi-
fies taking and destroying noncontraband property; if mate-
rial is examined and found not to be contraband, there can be 
no justification for its seizure. When, as here, the material 
at issue is not contraband it simply makes no sense to say 
that its seizure and destruction serves "legitimate institu-
tional interests." Ante, at 10, n. 8. Such seizures are 
unreasonable. 
The Court's holding is based on its belief that society would 
not recognize as reasonable the possessory interests of pris-
oners. Its perception of what society is prepared to recog-
nize as reasonable is not based on any empirical data; rather 
it merely reflects the perception of the five Justices who have 
joined the opinion that THE CHIEF JUSTICE has authored. 
On the question of what seizures society is prepared to con-
sider reasonable, surely the consensus on that issue in the 
lower courts is of some signficance. Virtually every federal 
judge to address the question over the past decade has con-
cluded that the Fourth Amendment does apply to a prison 
cell. 17 There is similar unanimity among the comentators. 18 
17 The Circuits which have addressed this question are unanimous. See, 
e. g., Lyon v. Farrier, 727 F. 2d 766, 769 (CA8 1984), cert. pending, No. 
83-6722; United States v. Mills, 704 F. 2d 1553, 1560-1561 (CAll 1983), 
cert. denied, 467 U. S.- (1984); United States v. Chamorro, 687 F. 2d 
1, 4-5 (CAl), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1043 (1982); United States v. 
Hinckley, 672 F. 2d 115, 128-132 (CADC 1982); United States v. Lilly, 576 
F. 2d 1240, 1245-1246 (CA5 1978); United States v. Ready, 574 F. 2d 1009, 
1013-1014 (CAlO 1978); United States v. Stumes , 549 F. 2d 831 (CA8 1977) 
(per curiam); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F. 2d 1311, 1315-1317 (CA7 1975), 
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The Court itself acknowledges that "intentional harassment 
of even the most hardened criminals cannot be tolerated by a 
civilized society." Ante, at 10. That being the case, I fail to 
see how a seizure that serves no purpose except harassment 
does not invade an interest that society considers reasonable, 
and that is protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
The Court rests its view of "reasonableness" almost en-
tirely upon its assessment of the security needs of prisons. 
Ante, at 8-10. Because deference to institutional needs is so 
critical to the Court's approach, it is worth inquiring as to the 
view prison adminstrators take toward conduct of the type at 
issue here. On that score the Court demonstrates a remark-
modified on other grounds, 545 F. 2d 565 (1976) (en bane), cert. denied, 435 
U. S. 932 (1978); Bethea v. Harris , 476 F . 2d 292 (CAlO), cert. denied, 414 
U. S. 872 (1973). The Court claims that the Second and Ninth Circuits 
have reached a conclusion in accord with its own, see ante, at 4, n. 5, but 
both of the decisions it cites predated Wolff. Prior to Wolff many courts 
thought that no judicial review of prison conditions was possible. See gen-
erally Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 985 (1962); Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique 
of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 Yale L. J. 506 
(1963). It is now the law in both Circuits that the Fourth Amendment 
protects prisoners against searches and seizures not reasonably related to 
institutional needs. See Hodges v. Stanley, 712 F. 2d 34, 35 (CA2 1983) 
(per curiam); DiGuiseppe v. Ward, 698 F. 2d 602, 605 (CA2 1983); United 
States v. Vallez, 653 F. 2d 403, 406 (CA9), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 904 
(1981); Sostre v. Preiser, 519 F. 2d 763 (CA2 1975); United States v. Daw-
son, 516 F . 2d 796, 805-806 (CA9), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 855 (1976); Han-
sen v. May, 502 F. 2d 728, 730 (CA9 1974); United States v. Savage, 482 F. 
2d 1371, 1372-1373 (CA9 1973), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 932 (1974). 
18 See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 23-6.10 Commentary (2d ed. 
1980); Gianelli & Gilligan, Prison Searches and Seizures: "Locking" the 
Fourth Amendment Out of Correctional Facilities, 62 Va. L. Rev. 1045 
(1976); Singer, Privacy, Autonomy, and Dignity in the Prison: A Prelimi-
nary Inquiry Concerning Constitutional Aspects of the Degredation Proc-
ess in Our Prisons, 21 Buffalo L. Rev. 669 (1972); Note, Constitutional 
Limitations on Body Searches in Prisons, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1033, 
1043-1055 (1982); Comment, Electronic Surveillance in California Prisons 
after Delancie v. Superior Court: Civil Liberty or Civil Death?, 22 Santa 
Clara L. Rev. 1109 (1982). 
,. 
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able lack of awareness as to what penologists and correctional 
officials consider "legitimate institutional interests." I am 
unaware that any responsible prison administrator has ever 
contended that there is a need to take and destroy noncon-
traband property of prisoners; the Court certainly provides 
no evidence to support its conclusion that institutions require 
this sort of power. To the contrary, it appears to be the 
near-universal view of correctional officials that guards 
should neither seize nor destroy noncontraband property. 
For example, the Federal Bureau of Prisons' regulations 
state that only items which may not be possessed by a pris-
oner can be seized by prison officials, see 28 CFR §§ 553.12, 
553.13 (1983). They also provide that prisoners can retain 
property consistent with prison management, specifically in-
cluding clothing, legal materials, hobbycraft materials, 
comissary items, radios and watches, correspondence, read-
ing materials, and personal photos. 19 Virginia law and its 
Department of Corrections' regulations similarly authorize 
seizure of contraband items alone. 20 I am aware of no prison 
system with a different practice; 21 the standards for prison 
19 See 28 CFR §§ 553.10, 553.11 (1983). The regulations also state: "Staff 
conducting the search shall leave the housing or work area as nearly as 
practicable in its original order." I d. § 552.13(b). See also United States 
Dept. of Justice, Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails § 13.01 (1980) 
("Written policy and procedure specify the personal property inmates can 
retain in their possession. . . . It should be made clear to inmates what 
personal property they may retain, and inmates should be assured both 
that the facility's policies are applied uniformly and that their property will 
be stored safely"). 
20 See Va. Code § 53.1-26 (1982) ("Any item of person property which a 
prisoner in any state correctional facility is prohibited from possessing by 
the Code of Virginia or by the rules of the Director shall, when found in the 
possession of a prisoner, be confiscated and sold or destroyed"); Virginia 
Department of Corrections, Division of Adult Services, Guideline No. 411 
(Sept. 16, 1983). 
21 For example, the Illinois regulation considered in Bonner v. Coughlin, 
517 F . 2d 1311 (CA71975), modified on other grounds, 545 F. 2d 565 (1976) 
(en bane), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 932 (1978), provided: "It is important and 
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administration which have been promulgated for correctional 
institutions invariably require prison officials to respect pris-
oners' possessory rights in noncontraband personal 
property. 22 
Depriving inmates of any residuum of privacy or posses-
sory rights is in fact plainly contrary to institutional goals. 
Sociologists recognize that prisoners deprived of any sense of 
individuality devalue themselves and others and therefore 
are more prone to violence toward themselves or others. 23 
At the same time, such an approach undermines the rehabili-
tative function of the institution: "Without the privacy and 
dignity provided by fourth amendment coverage, an inmate's 
opportunity to reform, small as it may be, will further be di-
minished. It is anomalous to ·provide a prisoner with re-
habilitative programs and services in an effort to build self-
respect while simultaneously subjecting him to unjustified 
and degrading searches and seizures." Gianelli & Gilligan, 
Prison Searches and Seizures: "Locking" the Fourth Amend-
ment Out of Correctional Facilities, 62 Va. L. Rev. 1045, 
1069 (1976). 
To justify its conclusion, the Court recites statistics con-
cerning the number of crimes that occur within prisons. For 
example, it notes that over an 18-month period approxi-
mately 120 prisoners were murdered in state and federal fa-
cilities. Ante, at 8. At the end of 1983 there were 438,830 
essential that searches be systematic and do not result in damage, loss, or 
abuse to any inmate's personal property. Deliberately damaging, con-
fiscating, or abusing any inmate's permitted personal property will result 
in disciplinary action against the offending employee." Id., at 1314, n. 6. 
22 See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 23-6.10 (2d Ed. 1980); Ameri-
can Correctional Association, Standards for Adult Correctional Institu-
tions 2-4192 (2d ed. 1981); National Advisory Commission on Criminal 
Standards and Goals, Corrections 2. 7 (1973). 
23 A summary of the literature is found in Schwartz, Deprivation of Pri-
vacy as a "Functional Prerequisite": The Case of the Prison, 63 J. Crim. L. 
& Criminology 229 (1972). 
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inmates in state and federal prisons. 24 The Court's homicide 
rate of 80 per year yields an annual prison homicide rate of 
18.26 persons per 100,000 inmates. In 1982, the homicide 
rate in Miami was 51.98 per 100,000; in New York it was 
23.50 per 100,000; in Dallas 31.53 per 100,000; and in the Dis-
trict of Columbia 30.70 per 100,000.25 Thus, the prison homi-
cide rate, it turns out, is significantly lower than that in many 
of our major cities. I do not suggest this type of analysis 
provides a standard for measuring the reasonableness of a 
search or seizure within prisons, but I do suggest that the 
Court's use of statistics is less than persuasive. 26 
The size of the inmate population also belies the Court's hy-
pothesis that all prisoners fit into a violent, incorrigible ste-
reotype. Many, of course, become recidivists. But literally 
thousands upon thousands of former prisoners are now lead-
ing constructive law-abiding lives. 27 The nihilistic tone of the 
Court's opinion-seemingly assuming that all prisoners have 
demonstrated an inability "to conform and control their be-
24 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 1983 (U. S. Dept. of Justice 
April 1984). 
211 See United States Department of Justice, Crime in the United States 
51, 65, 70, 92 (1983). 
26 The size of the prison population also sheds light on what society may 
consider reasonable with respect to the property and privacy of prisoners. 
When one recognizes that the prison population is constantly changing and 
that most inmates have family or friends who retain an interest in their 
well-being, one must acknowledge that millions of citizens may well believe 
that prisoners should retain some residuum of privacy and possessory 
rights. 
27 The Court's portrayal of the stereotypical prison inmate entirely over-
looks the wide range of individuals who actually have served and do serve 
time in the prison system. It ignores, for example, the conscientious ob-
jectors who refuse to register for the draft, and the corporate executives 
who have been convicted of violating securities, antitrust or tax laws, 
union leaders, former White House aides, former governors, judges, and 
legilsators, famous writers and sports heroes, and many thousands who 
have committed serious offenses but for whom crime is by no means a way 
of life. 
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havior to the legitimates standards of society by the normal 
impulses of self-restraint," ante, at 8, is consistent with its 
conception of prisons as sterile warehouses, but not with an 
enlightened view of the function of a modern prison system. 28 
In the final analysis, however, any deference to institu-
tional needs is totally undermined by the fact that Palmer's 
property was not contraband. If Palmer were allowed to 
possess the property, then there can be no contention that 
any institutional need or policy justified the seizure and de-
struction of the property. Once it is agreed that random 
searches of a prisoner's cell are reasonable to ensure that the 
cell contains no contraband, there can be no need for seizure 
and destruction of noncontraband items found during such 
searches. To accord prisoners any less protection is to de-
clare that the prisoners are entitled to no measure of human 
dignity or individuality-not a photo, a letter, nor anything 
except standard-issue prison clothing would be free from ar-
bitrary seizure and destruction. Yet that is the view the 
Court takes today. It declares prisoners to be little more 
28 I cannot help but think that the Court's holding is influenced by an un-
stated fear that if it recognizes that prisoners have any Fourth Amend-
ment protection this will lead to a flood of frivolous lawsuits. Of course, 
this type of burden is not sufficient to justify a judicial modification of the 
requirements of law. See Tower v. Glover, ante, at--; Patsy v. Florida 
Board of Regents, 457 U. S. 496, 512, n. 13 (1982). "Frivolous cases 
should be treated as exactly that, and not as occasions for fundamental 
shifts in legal doctrine. Our legal system has developed procedures for 
speedily disposing of unfounded claims; if they are inadequate to protect 
[defendants] from vexatious litigation, then there is something wrong with 
those procedures, not with the [Fourth Amendment]." Hoover v. 
Ronwin, 467 U. S. --, -- (1984) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (footnote 
omitted). In fact, the lower courts have permitted such suits to be 
brought for some time now, seen. 17, supra, without disastrous results. 
Moreover, costs can be awarded against the plaintiff when frivolous cases 
are brought, see id. at--, n. 27. Even modest assessments against 
prisoners' accounts could provide an effective weapon for deterring truly 
groundless litigation. 
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than chattels, a view I thought society had outgrown long 
ago. 
III 
By adopting its "bright line" rule, the Court takes the 
"hands off" approach to prison administration that I thought 
it had abandoned forever when it wrote in Wolff v. M cDon-
nell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974), that 
"though his rights may be diminished by the needs and 
exigencies of the insitutitonal environment, a prisoner is 
not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he 
is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn 
between the Constitution and the prisons of this coun-
try." Id., at 555-556. 
The first clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that 
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated .... " Today's holding means 
that the Fourth Amendment has no application at all to a 
prisoner's "papers and effects." This rather astonishing re-
peal of the Constitution is unprecedented; since Wolff we 
have consistently followed its command that "there must be 
mutual accomodation between institutional needs and objec-
tives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of gen-
eral application." I d., at 556. 29 
Today's holding cannot be squared with the text of the 
Constitution, nor with common sense. The Fourth Amend-
ment is of "general application," and its text requires that 
every search or seizure of "papers and effects" be evaluated 
for its reasonableness. The Court's refusal to inquire into 
the reasonableness of official conduct whenever a prisoner is 
involved-its conclusive presumption that all searches and 
seizures of prisoners' property are reasonable-can be 
squared neither with the constitutional text, nor with the re-
ality, acknowledged by the Court, that our prison system is 
29 See cases cited, nn. 15-16, supra. 
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less than ideal; unfortunately abusive conduct sometimes 
does occur in our prisons. 
More fundamentally, in its eagerness to adopt a rule con-
sistent with what it believes to be wise penal administration, 
the Court overlooks the purpose of a written Constitution 
and its Bill of Rights. That purpose, of course, is to ensure 
that certain principles will not be sacrificed to expediency; 
these are enshrined as principles of fundamental law beyond 
the reach of governmental officials or legislative majorities. 30 
The Fourth Amendment is part of that fundamental law; it 
represents a value judgment that unjustified search and sei-
zure so greatly threatens individual liberty that it must be 
forever condemned as a matter of constitutional principle. 31 
The courts, of course, have a special obligation to protect 
these rights. 32 Prisoners are truly the outcasts of society. 
80 "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects 
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the 
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to 
be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free 
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other funda-
mental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of 
no elections." West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 
624, 638 (1943). 
31 "The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favor-
able to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signficance of man's 
spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a 
part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions oflife are to be found in material 
things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, 
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Gov-
ernment, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and 
the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every un-
justifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, 
by whatever the means employed, must be deemd a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
32 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, 358-361 (1981) (BRENNAN, J., 
concurring in judgment); id., at 369 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judg-
ment); United States v. Bailey, 444 U. S. 394, 423-424 (1980) (BLACKMUN, 
J., dissenting). 
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Disenfranchised, scorned and feared, often deservedly so, 
shut away from public view, prisoners are surely a "discrete 
and insular minority." 33 In this case, the destruction of 
Palmer's property was a seizure; the Judiciary has a constitu-
tional duty to determine whether it was justified. The 
Court's conclusive presumption that all conduct by prison 
guards is reasonable is supported by nothing more than its 
idiosyncratic view of the imperatives of prison administra-
tion-a view not shared by prison administrators themselves. 
Such a justification is nothing less than a decision to sacrifice 
constitutional principle to the Court's own assessment of ad-
ministrative expendiency. 
More than a decade ago I wrote: 
"[T]he view once held that an inmate is a mere slave is 
now totally rejected. The restraints and the punish-
ment which a criminal conviction entails do not place the 
citizen beyond the ethical tradition that accords respect 
to the dignity and intrinsic worth of every individual. 
'Liberty' and 'custody' are not mutually exclusive con-
cepts." United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F. 
2d 701, 712 (CA 7 1973) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 
414 u. s. 1146 (1974). 
By telling prisoners that no aspect of their individuality, 
from a photo of a child to a letter from a wife, is entitled to 
constitutional protection, the Court breaks with the ethical 
tradition that I had thought was enshrined forever in our 
jurisprudence. 
33 See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U. S. -, -, n. 7 (1984); Toll v. Mo-
reno, 458 U. S. 1, 23 (1982) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring); O'Bannon v. 
Tov.m Court Nursing Center, 447 U. S. 773, 800, n. 8 (1980) (BLACKMUN, 
J., concurring in judgment); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. 
Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam); Hampton v. Mow Sun 
Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 102 and n. 22 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 
U. S. 365, 372 (1971); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 295, n. 14 (1971) 
(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. 
Carotene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938). 
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Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court's judg-
ment in 82-1630 and from Part II-A of its opinion. 
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